The impact op power and dependence in Buyer-Supplier Relationships on the use of electronic reverse auctions. En empirical study among public an private sector procurement professionals in the Netherlands by Nagel, B.W.
 
 
The Impact of Power and Dependence in 
Buyer-Supplier Relationships on the 
Use of Electronic Reverse Auctions 
- 
An Empirical Study among Public and Private Sector 
Procurement Professionals in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Open University of the Netherlands 
Faculty of Management Sciences 
Master of Science in Management Program 
Master’s Thesis 
 
First supervisor: dr. C.J. Gelderman 
Second supervisor: prof. dr. J. Semeijn 
 
Student: ing. B.W. Nagel 
Student number: 835874817 
 
July 11th, 2014 
  
  1
Preface 
 
 
 
Early in the year 2011, I started with the “Master of Science in Management” programme at The 
Open University of the Netherlands, of which this master’s thesis is the concluding part.  
 
For me, this master’s thesis has been the most enlightening part of the programme. It has taught me 
about the thesis topic itself and moreover taught me about approaching academic research. 
 
This study has been a quest. Please, let me assure you that the lengthening of the literature list can 
be understood as a proxy for my increasing modesty and increasing respect for scientific researchers. 
In short: science is not as simple and straightforward as many may assume, and few things are what 
they seem to be. 
 
In this respect the “Master of Science in Management” programme and master’s thesis study project 
have been a welcome respite from my daily practice,  where subjects are often profoundly simplified 
and proceeding carefully  is not a purpose in itself. 
 
Completing this master’s thesis study could not have been achieved without the support of many 
people. Support for which I am very grateful. 
 
I would like to thank the expert professionals involved for their verification of the survey documents, 
and the survey respondents for their willingness to spend some of their time.  
 
Also, I would like to thank both Open University’s supervisors, dr. Kees Gelderman and prof. dr. 
Janjaap Semeijn, for their supervision of this master’s thesis study, and prof. dr. Marjolein Caniëls for 
her research suggestions. 
 
Additionally, I would like to thank Open University’s first supervisor dr. Kees Gelderman for his 
continuing challenges, suggestions, encouragements, support and helpful and timely feedback during 
the course of this master’s thesis project. In his role as first supervisor Kees constantly enabled me to 
keep the momentum, by quickly providing concrete and constructive feedback. 
 
I would like to thank my father Willem Nagel and my eldest son Michael Nagel for checking the draft 
version of the thesis for misspellings.  
 
Finally, and for me most importantly, I express my enormous gratitude to my wife Linda Nagel and 
my sons Michael Nagel and Stein Nagel for giving me the opportunity to graduate, for a second time 
after two decades. Combining family life, university education and a full-time sales management job 
would have been utterly impossible without your continuing support, patience and inspiration. 
 
Bart Willem Nagel 
Lelystad, July 11th, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  2
Summary 
 
 
 
Problem statement 
Electronic reverse auctions (ERAs) are used to reduce costs of globally sourced components (Skjøtt-
Larsen, Kotzab, & Grieger, 2003; Skjøtt-Larsen, Schary, Mikkola, & Kotzab, 2007),  and reverse the 
roles of buyers and suppliers to drive purchase prices down (Kros, Nadler, & Chen, 2011). Buyers 
praised ERAs for bringing significant direct savings (Aloini, Dulmin, & Mininno, 2012; Schoenherr & 
Mabert, 2011; Settoon & Wyld, 2003) as well as other benefits like time savings (Jap & Haruvy, 2008), 
and efficiency (Yeniyurt, Watson, Carter, & Stevens, 2011). However, ERA benefits were exaggerated 
(Aloini et al., 2012; Emiliani, 2006; Emiliani & Stec, 2002, 2004, 2005b; Hawkins, Gravier, & 
Wittmann, 2010; Metty et al., 2005; Nagali et al., 2008; Sandholm et al., 2006), ERAs can negatively 
impact buyer-supplier relationships (Amelinckx, Muylle, & Lievens, 2008; Caniëls & Raaij, 2009; Jap, 
2002; Smart & Harrison, 2003; Smeltzer & Carr, 2003), and ERAs challenge suppliers’ trust in buyers 
(Carter et al., 2004; Emiliani & Stec, 2002; Gattiker, Huang, & Schwarz, 2007; Griffiths, 2003; Nadler & 
Kros, 2010; Schnellbächer, 2011). Therefore, many authors suggest empirical research into the 
determinants of ERA use (Kros et al., 2011; Mithas, Jones, & Mitchell, 2008; Saprikis, 2012; 
Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011; Tassabehji, 2010). Several authors suggest studying the impact of buyer 
and supplier power on ERA use (Parente, Venkataraman, Fizel, & Millet, 2004; Tassabehji, 2010). Cox 
identified that buyers should manage relationships appropriately in different conditions of 
transactional exchange, meaning that power can be a determinant factor for ERA use (Cox, 1999, 
2004). The larger the buyer’s market power, the more pressure the buyer can exert to provide 
competitive offers (Porter, 1985). This study aims at a new perspective on determinants of perceived 
ERA appropriateness, by looking into power and relationship linkages. The argument is that power 
and dependence in buyer-supplier relationships influence the ERA usage decision making process, 
and leads to the following problem statement: 
 
“What is the impact of power and dependence in buyer-supplier relationships on procurement 
professionals’ perceived ERA appropriateness?” 
 
 
Methodology 
This study aims at improving understanding of determinants of perceived ERA appropriateness. This 
is done by testing a conceptual framework and six hypotheses, mainly based on an extensive 
literature review of transaction cost economics, governance, and power and dependence: 
 
H₁: “Asset specificity has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
H₂: “Non-contractibility has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
H₃: “Contractual governance has a positive impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
H₄: “Relational governance has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
H₅: “Buyer’s net dependence has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
H₆: “Total interdependence has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
 
These hypothesis are empirically tested by means of an electronic survey questionnaire with 
different operationalised measures, among business-to-business procurement professionals in a 
sample of Dutch organisations in the public and private sectors. The sampling frame consists of a set 
of 1,702 organisations, formed by 805 large private sector organisations and 897 public sector 
institutions. The quantitative research uses a randomly sorted list of these 1,702 organisations. 
Through LinkedIn, procurement professionals at these organisations are randomly contacted, and are 
questioned on their experiences, perceptions and opinions concerning ERAs. 
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Results 
A total of 1,039 questionnaire invitations were sent and 259 complete responses were received 
(response rate 24.9%). Of these 259 responses, 16 responses were discarded because of their 
outlying characteristics. The statistical analyses in SPSS were consequently run on data from 243 
responses. After performing factor and reliability analyses, the statistical analysis on the six 
explanatory variables and dependent variable of the conceptual model was performed through 
multiple regression  analysis in SPSS. Significance was tested at a 95% reliability level. The multiple 
regression analysis showed that just 5.4% of the variance in the dependent variable perceived ERA 
appropriateness can be explained by the independent variables asset specificity, non-contractibility, 
contractual governance, relational governance, buyer net dependence and total interdependence 
(R²=.054) in the statistically significant conceptual model (p=.040). Only the variable buyer net 
dependence has a statistically significant unique contribution in predicting the dependent variable 
perceived ERA appropriateness (p=.034). Therefore, hypothesis H₅ is supported and hypotheses H₁, 
H₂, H₃, H₄ and H₆ are not supported by the empirical results. 
 
 
Conclusions 
This study aimed at a new perspective on determinants of perceived ERA appropriateness, by looking 
into suggested power and dependence links (Tassabehji, 2010). The first additional research question 
was what power and dependence in buyer-supplier relationships exactly are. Caniëls and Gelderman 
(2007) argue that a buyer’s dependence on a supplier is a potential supplier power source and that 
the primary outcome of relative dependence is relative power (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). They 
conclude that the relative power of a party is the result of the net dependency on the other party 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007; Pfeffer, 1981). The second additional 
research question was how power and dependence can be measured. Caniëls and Gelderman (2007) 
argue that buyer relative power is the difference between supplier dependence and buyer 
dependence and supplier relative power is the difference between buyer dependence and supplier 
dependence and developed measuring constructs. The construct buyer dependence consists of four 
items on the buyer’s cost of losing the supplier, difficulty of replacing the supplier, need for the 
supplier’s expertise, and dependence on the supplier. The construct supplier dependence consists of 
four items on the supplier’s cost of losing the buyer, difficulty of replacing the buyer, need for the 
buyer’s expertise, and dependence on the buyer (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007, 2010). 
 
Firstly, in regard to the expectation that asset specificity has a negative impact on perceived ERA 
appropriateness (Mithas et al., 2008), no supporting results were found. The expectation that higher 
asset specificity would lead to increased perceived ERA appropriateness (Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 
1987), was not supported. Similarly, in regard to the theoretical expectation that non-contractibility 
has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness (Mithas et al., 2008), no supporting results 
were found. The expectation that higher non-contractibility would lead to increased perceived ERA 
appropriateness (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a), is not supported by this study’s results.  
 
Thirdly, no supporting results were found for the expectation that contractual governance has a 
positive impact on perceived ERA appropriateness. This is in contrast with the expectation that 
organisations with a high priority on contractual governance prefer ERAs, compared to organisations 
that have a high priority on relational governance, who will prefer more cooperative exchanges than 
ERAs (Ferguson, Paulin, & Bergeron, 2005). Fourthly and likewise, no supporting results were found 
for the theoretical expectation that relational governance has a negative impact on perceived ERA 
appropriateness. It is possible that this study’s scenario-based approach influenced the outcome on 
the contractual governance and relational governance variables. Pearcy and Giunipero (2006) 
suggested that governance structure development depends on the purchase category (Pearcy & 
Giunipero, 2006), and in this survey a leverage product was suggested as the focal sourcing project. 
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Fifthly, supporting results were found for the expectation that buyer net dependence has a positive 
impact on perceived ERA appropriateness. This study, therefore, confirms that a buyer’s dependence 
on a supplier is a potential supplier power source (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007) and that the least 
dependent party dominates the exchange (Buchanan, 1992; Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Therefore, 
in a supplier dominance situation, the option for using an ERA is less likely. This significant 
explanatory power of buyer net dependence on perceived ERA appropriateness is the core result of 
this study. It shows that procurement professionals will favour ERAs in situations where they have 
less dependency on suppliers than vice versa and shows that procurement professionals will try to 
avoid ERAs or will prefer other sourcing methods than ERAs in circumstances where they have more 
dependency on suppliers than vice versa. Finally, no supporting results were found for the 
expectation that total interdependence has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness. 
The study findings seem to underline that ERAs tend to be used by buyers with supplier leverage 
(Emiliani, 2005; Tassabehji, Taylor, Beach, & Wood, 2006) in order to utilise their power position 
(Caniëls & Raaij, 2009). 
 
 
Recommendations 
This study’s findings can help practitioners use ERAs more effectively. Supporting empirical results 
showed that buyer net dependence has a positive impact on perceived ERA appropriateness. This 
study, therefore, confirms that a buyer’s dependence on a supplier is a potential supplier power 
source (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007) and that the least dependent party dominates the exchange 
(Buchanan, 1992; Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). The practical operationalisation of buyer and supplier 
dependence enables procurement professionals to assess buyer net dependence in a given sourcing 
situation. Another empirical finding that is relevant for practitioners is that, in contrast with 
literature (Ferguson et al., 2005), no support was found in the empirical results for either a positive 
impact on perceived ERA appropriateness of contractual governance, or a negative impact on 
perceived ERA appropriateness of relational governance. For practitioners this could mean that even 
in a situation that is characterised by a relational approach of the buyer-supplier relationship, the 
option of using an ERA does not have to be excluded automatically. Additionally, for practitioners it is 
valuable to know that the expected relation between organisation size and perceived ERA 
appropriateness (Mithas et al., 2008), was not found in this study’s results. This could mean that 
using ERAs is possibly also relevant for small and medium sized organisations. 
 
This study has specifically targeted procurement professionals in the Netherlands and the 
conclusions cannot be generalised beyond the Netherlands. Further research can be conducted in 
different geographical areas in order to get an international perspective. This study has specifically 
targeted procurement professionals in large enterprises, as far as the private sector is concerned. 
This has the effect that perceptions within small and medium sized enterprises remain 
underexposed, and generalisations cannot be made towards these organisations. Further research 
can be conducted including small and medium sized enterprises. Since the model explained only 
5,4% of the variance in the dependent variable perceived ERA appropriateness, it is obvious that the 
model does not represent a capacious explanation of perceived ERA appropriateness and that other 
factors have additional and substantial impact on perceived ERA appropriateness. Further empirical 
research can be conducted into the empirical relevance of literature-suggested factors such as the 
specifiability of the product and competition among suppliers (Hawkins, Randall, & Wittmann, 2009; 
Wyld, 2011). 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces and deals with the context and relevance of the present study’s problem 
statement and it also provides an overview of the study’s contents and design. 
 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
An online or electronic reverse auction (ERA) is “a dynamic web-enabled bid solicitation environment 
in which suppliers bid against each other in real-time, iteratively decreasing the selling price” 
(Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011). To reduce the unit cost of globally sourced components and materials, 
ERAs are increasingly and widely used (Skjøtt-Larsen et al., 2003; Skjøtt-Larsen et al., 2007). ERAs 
reverse the roles of the buyer and the supplier as suppliers compete to win business, with the main 
buyer’s objective to drive purchase prices down (Kros et al., 2011). ERA sourcing has had continued 
use (Schoenherr, 2008; Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011), and the soaring number of business-to-business 
(B2B) ERA service providers proves continued ERA interest, consolidation and growth expectations 
(Aloini et al., 2012; Hartley, Lane, & Duplaga, 2006; Hawkins et al., 2010; Kros et al., 2011; Saprikis, 
2012). ERAs have dramatically changed B2B sourcing practices (Saprikis, 2012) and for over a decade 
ERAs have become prevalent in many industries (Aloini et al., 2012; Carter & Kaufmann, 2007; Jap, 
2002; Stein, Hawking, & Wyld, 2003). 
 
ERA use expansion is attributed to buyers’ praise that ERAs have received since their introduction 
(Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011). ERAs have brought significant savings in terms of prices, transaction 
costs and benefits on business profitability, compared to traditional negotiation mechanisms (Aloini 
et al., 2012; Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011; Settoon & Wyld, 2003). Research has suggested that ERAs 
also give other benefits, i.e. time savings (Jap & Haruvy, 2008), efficiency (Yeniyurt et al., 2011), 
faster information transmission, increased supplier pools and increased competition among suppliers 
(Kros et al., 2011; Kumar & Maher, 2008; Sashi & O’Leary, 2002). However, the savings and benefits 
were often exaggerated (Aloini et al., 2012; Hawkins et al., 2010; Metty et al., 2005; Nagali et al., 
2008; Sandholm et al., 2006). 
 
Obviously, there are also negative aspects to ERAs. Firstly, research findings suggest that calculated 
savings were overstated because they focused on price reductions and not on the total costs across 
the supply chain (Emiliani, 2006; Emiliani & Stec, 2002, 2004, 2005b). Secondly, ERAs are reported to 
potentially negatively impact buyer-supplier relationships (Amelinckx et al., 2008; Caniëls & Raaij, 
2009; Jap, 2002; Smart & Harrison, 2003; Smeltzer & Carr, 2003), and challenge suppliers’ trust in 
buyers (Carter et al., 2004; Emiliani & Stec, 2002; Gattiker et al., 2007; Griffiths, 2003; Nadler & Kros, 
2010; Schnellbächer, 2011). Thirdly, ERAs form a potentially coercive use of buyer market power 
(Giampietro & Emiliani, 2007). Objections to ERAs are possible unethical behaviour (Carter et al., 
2004), opportunism (Jap, 2003, 2007), less personal interaction (Kros et al., 2011) and complexity 
(Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011). ERAs have been viewed negatively by suppliers because of price focus 
(Emiliani, 2002, 2004) and potential relationship damage (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011). Buyer-
supplier tensions exist, especially since suppliers often think that ERAs only benefit buyers 
(Giampietro & Emiliani, 2007; Tassabehji et al., 2006). Several refinements, guidelines and principles 
have made ERAs more acceptable to suppliers (Daly & Nath, 2005a, 2005b; Emiliani, 2005; Emiliani & 
Stec, 2005a; Hawkins et al., 2009). Some studies report minimal damage to buyer-supplier 
relationships (Caniëls & Raaij, 2009; Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). Nevertheless, many authors 
suggest future research into the determinants of ERA use (Kros et al., 2011; Schoenherr & Mabert, 
2011; Tassabehji, 2010). 
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Solid empirical research that explains perceived ERA appropriateness is lacking (Saprikis, 2012), and 
few studies empirically examined the determinant factors of ERA use (Mithas et al., 2008; Tassabehji, 
2010). Often, academics and practitioners hold opposing views, variously in support of or against the 
use of ERAs (Nadler & Kros, 2010; Tassabehji, 2010). Yeniyurt et al. (2011) studied the impact of ERAs 
on supplier’s perceptions of buyer’s opportunism and suggest including buyer-supplier relational 
factors in future studies (Yeniyurt et al., 2011). Hawkins et al. (2010) investigated sourcing managers’ 
reasons for using ERAs, and found that the decision to use ERAs go beyond rational, objective factors 
to internal human factors (Hawkins et al., 2010). Tassabehji (2010) studied why procurement 
professionals use ERAs and suggests including Cox’s power and relationship linkages (Cox, 2004; 
Tassabehji, 2010). Parente et al. (2004) suggest including relative power of suppliers and buyers as a 
determinant factor (Parente et al., 2004). These studies show that ERA use is a topical subject and 
point out practical and academic needs for further empirical research into determinants of perceived 
ERA appropriateness. 
 
Porter (1980) describes five forces to explain industry structure. Two of these, buyer bargaining 
power and supplier bargaining power, relate to power in the buyer-supplier relationship (Porter, 
1980). Buyer power has not been included in ERA studies as it is implicit and explicit in the literature 
that ERAs tend to be used by buyers with supplier leverage (Emiliani, 2005; Tassabehji et al., 2006). 
ERAs support embedded power bargaining routines (Emiliani, 2004). Many suppliers value ERAs as a 
buyer’s tool used to exploit a relationship power position (Caniëls & Raaij, 2009). The buyer’s 
perspective to understand ERA determinants assumes implicit buyer power (Tassabehji, 2010). 
However, the interests of buyers and suppliers are defined by their relative power positions in the 
context of specific transactions (Cox, Sanderson, & Watson, 2001). Any power imbalance conditions 
buyer and supplier behaviour in a buyer-supplier relationship (Cox et al., 2001). Cox identified that 
buyers should manage relationships appropriately in different conditions of transactional exchange 
(Cox, 1999, 2004). This means that power can be an important determinant factor for ERA use. 
Indeed, Cox posits that organisations are only successful if they possess power over others (Cox, 
1999) and that power is at the heart of all B2B relationships (Cox, 2001a). It even goes further than 
that: the larger the buyer’s market power, the more supplier pressure the buyer can exert to provide 
competitive offers (Porter, 1985). Differences in power influence bidding behaviour and motivation 
to compete in ERAs (Aloini et al., 2012). 
 
This study aims at a new perspective on determinants of perceived ERA appropriateness, by looking 
into power and relationship linkages as suggested by Tassabehji (2010). Cox (1999) has shown that 
buyers can manage business relationships appropriately differentiated in various conditions and 
should not choose for one fixed solution independent of power in the buyer-supplier relationship 
(Cox, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004; Tassabehji, 2010). This study also considers potential differences in 
current, former and non-users of ERAs (Hawkins et al., 2010; Tassabehji, 2010). The argument here is 
that power and dependence in buyer-supplier relationships should influence the decision making 
process that leads to using or not using ERAs, and leads to the following problem statement: 
 
“What is the impact of power and dependence in buyer-supplier relationships on procurement 
professionals’ perceived ERA appropriateness?” 
 
This study simultaneously aims at contributing to the body of knowledge on ERAs as well as 
improving understanding of determinants of perceived ERA appropriateness. This is done through 
testing a conceptual framework based on extensively reviewed literature. The study’s findings can 
contribute to a better theoretical understanding of ERAs and can help practitioners using ERAs more 
effectively. Other research questions to be answered are: “What are power and dependence in 
buyer-supplier relationships exactly?” and “How can power and dependence in buyer-supplier 
relationships be measured?” 
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1.2 Research method 
 
Hypotheses are set, based on an extensive literature review, and are empirically tested using a 
survey among Dutch procurement professionals. The empirical research concentrates on 
procurement professionals in a B2B setting. The electronic survey is performed through a sample of 
organisations in the Netherlands. This sample has a balanced sampling split towards the public and 
private sectors. The sampling frame consists of a set of 1,702 organisations. Two subsets form this 
set. 
 
The first subset consists of a list of 805 private sector organisations. Their data was downloaded 
during February 2014 from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce website (KvK, 2014). The selection was 
set on all organisations with economic activity and more than 300 full-time employees. The second 
subset consists of a list of 897 public sector institutions. Their data was downloaded during February 
2014 from the Dutch Government’s websites Overheid.nl for government administrations 1 
(Overheid.nl, 2014), DUO.nl for educational and research institutions (DUO, 2014) and the Dutch 
association of hospitals’ website for general, specialised and academic hospitals (NVZ, 2014). 
 
The quantitative empirical research uses a randomly sorted list of these 1,702 organisations. Through 
LinkedIn, procurement professionals at these organisations are contacted and are sent a personal 
invitation to cooperate in the survey. This is done until the moment that at least 100 of these 
contacted procurement professionals have completed usable survey responses. These procurement 
professionals are questioned on their experiences, perceptions and opinions concerning ERAs. The 
unit of analysis in this study is the buyer-supplier relationship, for a particular product group sourced 
recently. This is similar to the studies of Mithas et al. (2008), Parente et al. (2004) and Schoenherr 
and Mabert (2011) (Mithas et al., 2008; Parente et al., 2004; Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011). The 
procurement professionals can be current users, former users or non-users of ERAs. Respondents are 
given confidentiality and anonymity guarantees. 
  
                                                 
1 advisory bodies, independent administrative bodies, government agencies, municipalities, ministries, provinces, judiciary 
institutions, police, fire departments, regional cooperation bodies and water boards 
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2. Literature review 
 
 
 
This chapter forms a bridge between the problem statement and the methodology of the empirical 
research, and deals with the theoretical expectations of this study’s empirical research. 
 
 
2.1 Perceived ERA appropriateness 
 
The problem statement is defined as what the impact of power and dependence in buyer-supplier 
relationships is on the procurement professionals’ perceived ERA appropriateness. The dependent 
variable in this study, therefore, is perceived ERA appropriateness. The conceptual definition of an 
ERA is “a dynamic web-enabled bid solicitation environment in which suppliers bid against each 
other in real-time, iteratively decreasing the selling price” (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011). A buyer-
supplier relationship refers to “a relationship in which purchasing transactions of goods or services 
are managed, between a buying and a supplying organisation” (Mithas et al., 2008). According to 
Hawkins et al. (2009) the conceptual definition of perceived ERA appropriateness is “the degree to 
which a sourcing professional views the use of an ERA as a fit between the attributes of the tool, the 
specific requirement being sourced, and the supply market” (Hawkins et al., 2009; Wyld, 2011). It is 
necessary to understand this professional’s perception of ERA appropriateness. Mithas et al. (2008) 
call this procurement professional’s perception of ERA appropriateness “the self-reported likelihood 
of ERA use” (Mithas et al., 2008). Hawkins et al. (2009) argue, relying on the Theory of Reasoned 
Action, that there is a relation between perceived ERA appropriateness, attitude and actual ERA 
appropriateness (Hawkins et al., 2009). They state that the Theory of Reasoned Action suggests a 
relation between behaviour and attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), and that perceived ERA 
appropriateness precedes intention of ERA use and ERA use (Hawkins et al., 2009). Gumussoy and 
Calisir (2009) similarly argue that behavioural intention can be explained by the attitude towards 
behaviour and subjective norms. Their study showed significant relationships between perceived 
usefulness of ERAs and behavioural intention to use ERAs, and between behavioural intention to use 
ERAs and actual use of ERAs (Gumussoy & Calisir, 2009). Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw (1988) 
found “strong overall evidence for the predictive utility” of the model of the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (Sheppard et al., 1988). Finally, Hawkins et al. (2009) clarify that, although perceived ERA 
appropriateness precedes ERA use, extraneous factors in a sourcing situation can lead to not using 
ERAs, notwithstanding existing perceived ERA appropriateness (Hawkins et al., 2009; Wyld, 2011). 
 
It is important to understand that this study is about the impact of various influential factors 
amongst current, former and non-users of ERAs. The outcome of these factors is not ERA use per se, 
and can also lead to not using ERAs. This means that the perception of ERA appropriateness is crucial. 
This study aims at offering a wider perspective on determinants of perceived ERA appropriateness, 
by looking into power and dependence in buyer-supplier relationships in the private and public 
sectors, as suggested by Tassabehji (2010). The argument is that power and dependence influence 
the decision making process that leads to using or not using ERAs. The strategic implications of ERA 
use suggests that researchers and practitioners should increase their understanding of how 
procurement professionals perceive and determine ERA appropriateness (Hawkins et al., 2009; 
Kumar & Maher, 2008). Concerning this issue, buyer perception factors are essential (Hawkins et al., 
2010; Hawkins et al., 2009). Hawkins et al. (2009) defined perceived ERA appropriateness as “the 
degree to which a sourcing professional views the use of an ERA as a fit between the attributes of the 
tool, the specific requirement being sourced, and the supply market” (Hawkins et al., 2009). Parente 
et al. (2004) composed a comprehensive ERA research framework based on successful organisations’ 
business models. They use Systems Theory to explain ERA use, and consider the specific ERA as the 
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framework’s unit of analysis. Dimensions of the input (supplier, buyer, buyer-supplier relationship 
and product), process and output factors are discussed, in order to develop the conceptual model 
(Parente et al., 2004). They argue that power is relevant for ERA use, and state that in an ERA the 
relationships between buyer and potential suppliers are influenced by each dyad in the ERA. They 
suggest that, in an ERA with a powerful buyer, a potential supplier will do business on the buyer’s 
terms, and argue that the relative influence and power of these two organisations affect their 
interaction. Finally, they refer to Porter’s Five Forces Industry Analysis, stating that bargaining power 
of buyers and suppliers is a suitable perspective to analyse ERAs (Parente et al., 2004; Porter, 1980). 
 
 
2.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Schoenherr and Mabert (2011) use the Theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) in their study. 
TCE explains relationships from the perspective of the most efficient governance structure and that, 
as dependency increases, hierarchy (i.e. face-to-face negotiations) replaces transactional market 
relationships (i.e. ERAs) (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011; Williamson, 1979, 1981, 2002). According to 
them, the four governing TCE factors are bounded rationality, opportunism, information asymmetry 
and small numbers bargaining. Usually, characteristics complicating transactions are associated with 
asset specificity and uncertainty. Schoenherr & Mabert conducted a survey amongst purchasing 
professionals with the request for quotation as the unit of analysis. They compared ERAs and offline 
procurement along the lines of future orientation, purchase importance, supply market availability 
and product specification difficulty. They found that as purchase importance increases, the perceived 
ERA appropriateness decreases and that as supply market availability increases, the perceived ERA 
appropriateness increases (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011). Mithas et al. (2008) also based their ERA-
study on TCE. They posit that research on information technology-enabled buyer-supplier 
relationships focuses on TCE arguments with asset specificity as the main reason for organisational 
boundaries (Malone et al., 1987; Mithas et al., 2008; Williamson, 1979), and that many academics 
argued to extend TCE towards perspectives as Relational Theory and Incomplete Contracts Theory 
(Mithas et al., 2008). Concerning Incomplete Contracts factors, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993a, 
1993b) argue that non-contractible elements (e.g. quality commitment, technological investments, 
information sharing, trust and flexibility) could affect sourcing decisions (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 
1993a, 1993b; Mithas et al., 2008). Mithas et al. aimed to determine the effect of non-contractibility, 
in comparison to more traditional TCE determinants, on perceived ERA appropriateness, and claim 
that non-contractibility and asset specificity as explanations for ERA sourcing choices were not 
sufficiently assessed yet (Mithas et al., 2008). 
 
 
2.3 Asset specificity 
 
Mithas et al. (2008) quote Malone et al. (1987) on TCE predictions that information technology 
reduces exchange coordination costs, and that information technology would transit organisations to 
more market mechanism use, the so-called Electronic Market Hypothesis (Malone et al., 1987; 
Mithas et al., 2008). They state some academics enhanced TCE by considering intangible specificity 
attributes (in addition to tangible traditional investments in specialised assets), and others enhanced 
TCE by identifying extra specificity dimensions like buyer side asset specificity, business process 
specificity, domain knowledge specificity and information specificity (Mithas et al., 2008). However, 
they conclude that a framework that overcomes traditional TCE limitations by “identifying and 
measuring intangible investments and recognizing their endogenous nature” is needed. The 
Incomplete Contracts Theory expands understanding of electronic market practice by explaining non-
contractibility (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a) and complements asset specificity and relational 
arguments by describing intangible investments (Mithas et al., 2008). Mithas et al. (2008) refined the 
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differences between non-contractibility and asset specificity, in order to make a clear distinction 
between them. The conceptual definition of asset specificity is “the degree to which investment in a 
particular asset has lower value in its next-best use” (Mithas et al., 2008; Williamson, 1979). By 
contrast, the conceptual definition of non-contractibility is “difficult-to-specify future investments 
that a firm may need to make to sustain a set of existing transactions or to initiate a new set of 
exchanges with the same partner” (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Mithas et al., 2008). Non-
contractible elements of an exchange, like quality commitment, technological investments, 
information sharing, responsiveness, trust and flexibility, affect an organisation’s capacity to develop 
competitive advantage (Mithas et al., 2008). TCE tries to embed non-contractibility, by including 
uncertainty in boundary choices. However, non-contractibility occurs unexpectedly, which makes 
writing contracts that cover all contingencies impossible. Williamson summarises that all contracts 
are inevitably incomplete (Williamson, 2002). The Incomplete Contracts Theory states that if these 
non-contractible elements occur after the contracting moment (ex-post), they will have to be dealt 
with, with goodwill and willingness of all parties concerned, at that moment and cannot be dealt with 
on a contractual basis before the contracting moment (ex-ante), because investments on elements 
with unknown probability are unverifiable and economically senseless (Mithas et al., 2008). Mithas et 
al. (2008) state “asset specificity is a characteristic of investment in an asset that supports a 
particular transaction or series of stable transactions, while non-contractibility is a characteristic of 
investment in activities that involve a series of changing transactions between organizations over 
time”. Non-contractibility is, therefore, not just another form of asset specificity. The difference is 
that asset specificity involves estimable investments, whereas non-contractibility involves unknown 
future investments (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Mithas et al., 2008). The study of Mithas et al. 
(2008) showed results where non-contractibility has greater explanatory power than asset specificity 
for perceived ERA appropriateness (Mithas et al., 2008).  
 
Continuing with non-contractibility, one has to keep in mind its key dimensions and determine how 
these affect organisational sourcing decisions. Mithas et al. (2008) follow Bakos and Brynjolfsson 
(1993a, 1993b) and use the dimensions commitment to quality, technological investments, 
information sharing, responsiveness, trust and flexibility from previous studies to construct the non-
contractibility concept (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Mithas et al., 2008). They follow Malone et al. 
(1987) in predicting that information technology induces outsourcing through market mechanisms 
(Malone et al., 1987; Mithas et al., 2008). Mithas et al. (2008) posit “electronic hierarchies frequently 
develop into biased, then unbiased markets when the products themselves are not asset specific and 
are easily described in standardized terms” and “in the long run, the significant additional benefits to 
buyers ... will drive almost all electronic markets toward being unbiased channels for products from 
many suppliers” (Malone et al., 1987). Through this, the Electronic Market Hypothesis implies that 
buyer-supplier relationships that require general investments (low asset specificity) are more 
suitable for ERAs. Choudhury, Hartzel, and Konsynski (1998) argue similarly (Choudhury et al., 1998). 
On the other hand, the Electronic Market Hypothesis implies that buyer-supplier relationships that 
require specific investments (high asset specificity) are less suitable for ERAs. Through this line of 
reasoning, we join Mithas et al. (2008) in hypothesizing that, procurement professionals are less 
likely to perceive ERAs as appropriate, as asset specificity increases. 
 
H₁: “Asset specificity has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
 
 
2.4 Non-contractibility 
 
Mithas et al. (2008) posit that, to explain market mechanisms sufficiently, non-contractibility must 
accompany asset specificity. In the Electronic Market Hypothesis the development of information 
technology leads to “a contraction in a firm’s boundaries” and “a move towards long-term 
relationships with preferred suppliers” (Malone et al., 1987; Mithas et al., 2008). The Incomplete 
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Contracts Theory stipulates that, if not all contingencies in a relationship can be specified ex-ante, ex-
post bargaining power determines investments during the relationship. It can be cost-effective for 
parties to rely on trust, ex-post bargaining, and long-term relationships to deal with non-contractible 
aspects, instead of depending on written contractual governance (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a). 
Since supplier investments in non-contractible aspects are essential for the relationship’s success, the 
buyer should focus on a close relation with a potential investment ready supplier (Mithas et al., 
2008). Through this line of reasoning, we join Mithas et al. (2008) in hypothesizing that, procurement 
professionals are less likely to perceive ERAs as appropriate, as non-contractibility increases. 
 
H₂: “Non-contractibility has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
 
 
2.5 Governance  
 
TCE explains relationships from the perspective of the most effective governance structure. It 
stipulates that as buyer-supplier dependency increases, hierarchy replaces transactional market 
relationships. One of the four factors governing TCE is opportunism (Williamson, 1979, 1981, 2002), 
defined as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1979). Since organisations strive for 
competitive advantage and financial performance, opportunism risk exists (Hawkins, Wittmann, & 
Beyerlein, 2008; Williamson, 1979, 1981, 2002) and opportunism can damage buyer-supplier 
relationships (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Caniëls, Gelderman, & Vermeulen, 2012). Williamson 
(1979) argues that opportunistic behaviour (e.g. deceiving, lying, cheating) is about achieving one’s 
own objectives, regardless of any harm caused to others, and advises on commissioning opportunism 
mitigating governance structures (Williamson, 1979). John (1984) and Provan and Skinner (1989) 
follow Williamson (1981) in positing that opportunism risk is particularly high in long-term 
relationships and can be reduced by using more coordinated governance structures (i.e. vertical 
integration) (Clemons, Reddi, & Row, 1993; John, 1984; Provan & Skinner, 1989; Williamson, 1981). 
Clemons and Row (1992) and Clemons et al. (1993) argue that information technology can play a vital 
role in this and can reduce coordination investments, whilst improving risk control. However, 
uncertainty increases opportunism risk, as it is difficult to anticipate all contingencies (Clemons et al., 
1993; Clemons & Row, 1992).  
 
Jap and Ganesan (2000) defined governance mechanisms as “safeguards that firms put in place to 
govern the inter-organizational exchange, minimize exposure to opportunism and protect 
transaction specific investments” (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Jap & Ganesan, 2000). Caniëls and 
Gelderman (2010) posit that organisations can utilise three types of governance mechanisms to 
manage opportunism: contractual governance (i.e. administrative control), exchange governance (i.e. 
power and self-interested commitment), and relational governance (i.e. relational norms) (Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2010; Heide & John, 1992; Lusch & Brown, 1996; Macneil, 1983, 2000). According to 
Caniëls & Gelderman, contracts can be seen as a less far-reaching vertical integration type (Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2010), and as such are substitutes for the formal governance mechanisms hierarchy and 
integration (Ferguson et al., 2005). Achrol and Gundlach (1999) argue that both contractual and 
social safeguards are useful in mitigating opportunism risk (Achrol & Gundlach, 1999). Pearcy and 
Giunipero (2006) suggest that buying organisations develop either transactional or relational 
governance structures depending on the purchase category (Pearcy & Giunipero, 2006). Other 
authors argue that organisations interchangeably use formal governance mechanisms, i.e. market 
contracts and authority (Yu, Liao, & Lin, 2006), as well as relational governance mechanisms, i.e. 
relational norms like trust (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995).  
 
Notwithstanding simultaneous use of diverse governance mechanisms, literature shows opposing 
viewpoints whether these mechanisms are complementary or substitutable (Caniëls et al., 2012; 
Ness & Haugland, 2005). Authors that support the plural governance thesis argue that governing 
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exchange relations depends on combining of and interacting of contractual governance with 
relational governance (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000; Ferguson et al., 
2005; Macneil, 2000; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Zheng, Roehrich, & Lewis, 2008), rather than statically 
positioning on a transactional-relational exchange governance continuum, from weak-tie to strong-
tie (Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2000; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Ferguson et al., 2005; Joshi & Stump, 1999). 
Following Ferguson et al. (2005), in this study the conceptual definition of contractual governance is 
“the degree to which the formal contract is implemented in the exchange”, and the conceptual 
definition of relational governance is “the strength of the social norms present in the exchange” 
(Ferguson et al., 2005).  
 
Several authors suggested substantial impact of information technology usage, which is applicable 
for ERAs, on relationship governance structure (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Clemons et al., 1993). 
Relevant for the present study is whether the level of either contractual or relational governance 
impacts perceived ERA appropriateness. Caniëls and Gelderman (2010) posit that TCE implies that, 
after transaction specific investing in a buyer-supplier relationship, organisations should establish 
opportunistic behaviour restraining control mechanisms (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Williamson, 
1979, 1981, 2002). Williamson (1979, 1981, 2002) proposed opportunism protection by moving from 
arm’s length market relationships, which ERAs essentially are, to vertically integrated relationships 
(Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Williamson, 1979, 1981, 2002). Nevertheless, the largest outsourcing 
risk remains other parties’ non-performance (Hofenk, Schipper, Semeijn, & Gelderman, 2011), and 
contractual instruments are often used to mitigate this (Hofenk et al., 2011). Formal contracts imply 
defined transactions, agreements, promises, and terms (Ferguson et al., 2005), and are instruments 
that seek to reduce risk and uncertainty (Ferguson et al., 2005; Lusch & Brown, 1996). Contracts 
provide a legally bound, institutional framework for most supply arrangements and facilitate 
effective exchange (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Zheng et al., 2008). They delineate what behaviour 
is allowed, or not (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Lui & Ngo, 2004), and stipulate how occurring 
disputes and conflicts are handled (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010). For exchanges with limited 
idiosyncratic investments and relative certainty, the market is expected to be a more effective 
governance form than internal organisation or hierarchy (Cannon et al., 2000). 
 
Towards hypothesizing on the relationship between perceived ERA appropriateness and contractual 
governance, four aspects are relevant. Firstly, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993a, 1993b) concluded that 
ERAs locate on the contractual governance side of the contractual-relational continuum (Bakos & 
Brynjolfsson, 1993a, 1993b), due to extensive documentation of specifications and terms (Anderson 
& Frohlich, 2001; Mithas & Jones, 2007; Mithas et al., 2008). Secondly, ERAs are essentially arm’s 
length market relationships, and for this reason organisations with a high priority on contractual 
governance will prefer ERAs, compared to organisations that have a high priority on relational 
governance, that will prefer more cooperative exchanges (Ferguson et al., 2005). Thirdly, Ferguson et 
al. (2005) argue that the contractual-relational continuum stretches from a short-term, price-focused 
end towards a social, long-term, enduring relationship end (Ferguson et al., 2005). One can match 
the former with ERA use, and the latter with a more traditional sourcing process. Fourthly, the weak-
tie approach, on the weak-tie to strong-tie continuum, is usually associated with arm’s length 
exchanges, based on financial parameters and formal contracts. This weak-tie approach focuses on 
short-term governance issues, as described in TCE, close to what was described about ERAs. Undue 
reliance on the formal contract signifies a transaction oriented approach and an adversarial 
relationship (Ferguson et al., 2005; Gundlach & Achrol, 1993). Arm’s length exchanges are 
characterised by legal contracts, accompanied by aggressive bargaining, to settle non-contract issues 
(Ferguson et al., 2005). This leads to the expectation that procurement professionals are more likely 
to perceive ERAs as appropriate, as contractual governance increases. 
 
H₃: “Contractual governance has a positive impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
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Contractual governance can handle foreseeable contingencies with predefined remedies or define 
solutions for unexpected contingencies (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Zheng et al., 2008). On the opposite 
end of contractual governance in the contractual-relational continuum resides relational governance, 
characterised by moral principles rather than legal agreements (Ferguson et al., 2005). Where short-
term, price-focus and arm’s length exchanges characterise contractual governance, social, long-term, 
enduring relations and cooperative exchanges characterise relational governance (Ferguson et al., 
2005), with a strong-tie approach with social norms (Ferguson et al., 2005; Macneil, 1983, 2000). 
Relationship marketing implies that long-term relationships yield better results, through trust and 
commitment, than short-term exchange (Hofenk et al., 2011; Min et al., 2005; Morgan & Hunt, 
1994). Trust, defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998), is typical for relational governance with shared norms and values. These norms are 
flexibility, solidarity, information exchange (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Granovetter, 1985; Heide & 
John, 1992; Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Lusch & Brown, 1996; Macneil, 1983, 2000), mutuality, role 
integrity, and harmony (Caniëls et al., 2012; Ness & Haugland, 2005). Relational governance is often 
associated with long-term strategic alliances with cooperation and obligational norms (Bradach & 
Eccles, 1989; Macneil, 2000). Pearcy, Giunipero, and Wilson (2007) empirically tested the role of 
strategic importance of existing buyer-supplier relationships on ERA use and their results indicated 
that strategic relationships favoured relational governance, even if they would still choose for using 
ERAs (Pearcy et al., 2007). Caniëls and Gelderman (2010) posit that a sociological approach of 
interfirm relationships, advocating social resources for governance (Achrol & Gundlach, 1999; Caniëls 
& Gelderman, 2010; Granovetter, 1985; Macneil, 1983, 2000), with tight inter-organisational bonds 
and relational norms is vital in mitigating opportunism (Achrol & Gundlach, 1999; Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2010; Ferguson et al., 2005; Heide & John, 1988, 1992). These relational norms concern 
shared values and expectations about appropriate behaviour, goals and policies (Brown et al., 2000; 
Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Ferguson et al., 2005), reflect expectations on cooperation and achieving 
mutuality, and represent social exchange control (Cannon et al., 2000). They accommodate a 
bilateral strategy for unforeseeable contingencies and facilitate adaptations in long-term 
relationships (Zheng et al., 2008). 
 
Towards hypothesizing on the relationship between perceived ERA appropriateness and relational 
governance, six aspects are relevant. Firstly, Mithas et al. (2008) argued that buyers valuing flexible 
suppliers are less likely to initiate arm’s length relationships through ERAs. They found a significant 
negative relation between relationship-oriented supply chain strategy, consisting of striving for long-
term supplier relations and avoiding frequent supplier changes in service of better prices (Bensaou, 
1997), and ERA use (Mithas et al., 2008). Secondly, ERAs fall towards the opposite end of relational 
governance on the contractual-relational continuum (Anderson & Frohlich, 2001; Bakos & 
Brynjolfsson, 1993a, 1993b; Mithas & Jones, 2007; Mithas et al., 2008). Thirdly, organisations with a 
priority on relational governance prefer cooperative exchanges over ERAs with their arm’s length 
market relationships (Ferguson et al., 2005). Fourthly, one can match the social, long-term, enduring 
relationships in relational governance, with a more traditional sourcing process than ERAs (Ferguson 
et al., 2005). Fifthly, the strong-tie approach on the transactional-relational continuum is usually 
associated with cooperative exchanges based on social norms. The strong-tie approach has long-term 
focus (Williamson, 1979, 1981, 2002), unlike ERAs. Sixthly, unlike ERAs, close social ties may restrict 
companies in spotting opportunities and acquiring knowledge outside their networks (Zheng et al., 
2008). This leads to the expectation that procurement professionals are less likely to perceive ERAs 
as appropriate, as relational governance increases. 
 
H₄: “Relational governance has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
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2.6 Power and dependence  
 
Tassabehji (2010) suggested studying Cox’s power and relationship linkages, ranging from adversarial 
arm’s length relationships to non-adversarial collaborative relationships, to improve understanding 
perceived ERA appropriateness (Tassabehji, 2010). Power is includable, as literature describes that 
ERA use is imposed by buyers with leverage over suppliers (Tassabehji, 2010), e.g. the term power-
based bargaining tool as a de facto ERA synonym (Emiliani, 2005; Tassabehji et al., 2006). Caniëls and 
Gelderman (2007) quote Pfeffer (1981), regarding the Resource Dependence Theory, on the 
definition of relative power of an organisation as “the result of the net dependence of the one on the 
other”. If A depends on B more than B depends on A, then B has power over A (Caniëls & Gelderman, 
2007; Pfeffer, 1981). Party A's power over party B is determined by B's dependence on A for valued 
resources. B's dependence on A is high if alternative sources of valued resources are limited (Dwyer 
et al., 1987). As noted by Emerson (1962), power is the obverse of dependency (Emerson, 1962). 
Caniëls and Gelderman (2005, 2007) join Dubois and Pedersen (2002) in recognising that power 
differences between buyers and suppliers are a fundamental purchasing portfolio model principle 
(Caniëls & Gelderman, 2005, 2007; Dubois & Pedersen, 2002). Characteristic for leverage products in 
the Kraljic matrix (Kraljic, 1983), and derived models, is the recommendation to utilise buying power 
(Caniëls & Gelderman, 2005; Gelderman & Weele, 2003). Caniëls and Gelderman (2005) posit that 
the relative power and dependence position of buyers and suppliers is critical in purchasing strategy 
choice (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2005). Understanding buyer-supplier power, its balance and different 
configurations and structures in the supply and value chains is essential for buyers to properly 
manage supplier relationships (Cox, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004; Sanderson, 2004). 
 
Cox (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004a) posits business literature is more about collaborative relationship 
management than supply chain competition. Competition is between supply chains, and long-term 
close relationships based on trust, commitment and partnership are recommended. Enhancing the 
performance of the entire supply chain creates successes (Cox, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004). However, 
Cox (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004a) does not agree with the assumption in literature that there is just 
one “lean” best way to manage supply relationships. He raises the questions whether supply chain 
thinking focuses on business strategy sufficiently, and whether organisations strategically position 
themselves in order to own vital resources in their primary supply chain. Cox claims that a focus of 
pursuing a position that allows an organisation to leverage value from customers, employees, 
competitors and suppliers is context dependent (Cox, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004). This context aspect 
means that organisations can only achieve sustained success if they have power over others in their 
supply chain and market relationships, and use this power to capture value from relationships (Cox, 
1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004). This implies that buyer-supplier relationships should be “of a continuous 
conflictual nature and exist in a permanent state of tension” (Cox, 2001a; Cox, Watson, Lonsdale, & 
Sanderson, 2004). Power is key in all buyer-supplier relationships (Cox, 2001b; Cox et al., 2004). In a 
situation of structural dominance, the dominant party controls key value creating resources, and 
creates a structured hierarchy of dependent suppliers. Power is a key factor for influencing an 
organisation’s network (Lamming, Johnsen, Zheng, & Harland, 2000). Understanding how power 
structures work, how one enhances supply chain power and what types of supply chain power 
configurations are available in any given situation is critical for supply chain practitioners (Cox, 1999). 
 
Caniëls and Gelderman (2007) argued that power and interdependence are vital in understanding 
buyer-supplier relationships, defined the concepts of power and dependence in terms of buyer and 
supplier dependence, and developed constructs for buyer dependence and supplier dependence. 
Organisations always depend on exchange partners, albeit in varying extent, and dependence has 
reciprocity. They argue that mutual dependence and power are closely related and that a buyer’s 
dependence on a supplier is a potential supplier power source (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007), that the 
primary outcome of relative dependence is relative power, and quote Buchanan (1992) on her 
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argument that the least dependent party dominates the exchange (Buchanan, 1992; Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2007). Caniëls and Gelderman (2007) further conclude that studies clearly distinct 
relative power and total power, with the former being the result of dependence asymmetry and the 
latter being the result of total interdependence of both parties. They join Pfeffer (1981) and 
Bacharach and Lawler (1981) in defining relative power and total power in terms of buyer 
dependence and supplier dependence (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Pfeffer, 1981), and their viewpoint 
that the relative power of a party is the result of the net dependency on the other party. Ergo, buyer 
relative power is the difference between supplier dependence and buyer dependence, and supplier 
relative power is the difference between buyer dependence and supplier dependence. Finally, 
Caniëls and Gelderman argue that a full view of the buyer-supplier relationship should include an 
assessment of net dependence, corresponding to each party’s relative power, as well as total 
interdependence, as the sum of buyer and supplier dependence, corresponding to the relationship’s 
intensity and development phase (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). 
 
Gelderman, Semeijn, and Zoete (2008) posit that in an asymmetric relationship the least powerful 
most dependent party complies with the most powerful least dependent party, due to lack of 
alternatives. They follow Gadde and Mattsson (1987) in positing that if the former is the buyer, the 
buyer’s behaviour is determined by the barriers lack of alternatives and switching risk and costs 
(Gadde & Mattsson, 1987; Gelderman et al., 2008). They cite Blau (1964), in stating that the greater 
the power imbalance, the easier the powerful party makes unreasonable demands (Blau, 1964; 
Gelderman et al., 2008). Gelderman (2003) posits literature consensus on the definition of power, 
formulated by Gaski (1984), as “the ability to cause someone to do something he or she would not 
have done otherwise” (Gaski, 1984; Gelderman, 2003) and the definition of dependence, formulated 
by Frazier, Gill, and Kale (1989), as “the degree to which a party needs to maintain its relationship in 
order to achieve desired goals” (Frazier et al., 1989; Gelderman, 2003). Gelderman (2003) follows 
Pfeffer (1981) in the definition of relative power as “the difference between the dependence of the 
two parties on one another” (Gelderman, 2003; Pfeffer, 1981) and follows Geyskens, Steenkamp, 
Scheer, and Kumar (1996) in the definition of total interdependence in a buyer-supplier relationship 
as “the sum of each firm’s dependence on its partner” (Gelderman, 2003; Geyskens et al., 1996). 
Gelderman (2003) concludes that the amount of interdependence in a buyer-supplier relationship is 
reflected by the magnitude (total interdependence) and the symmetry of dependence (net 
dependence) between parties, and that there are four possible dependency combinations. He 
discusses the determinants and antecedents of buyer-supplier dependence mentioned in conceptual 
and empirical studies and summarises that two factors determine dependency: the need for a 
resource (importance) and the availability of alternative sources (substitutability) (Gelderman, 2003). 
The first factor positively affects dependence and the last factor negatively affects dependence. 
 
Figure 1 Mutual dependency combinations 
 
Source: Modified from Gelderman (2003), (Gelderman, 2003, p. 122). 
Supplier’s 
dependence 
Total interdependence 
Buyer dependence=Supplier dependence 
 
High mutual dependence:  
Buyer dependence and supplier dependence 
is high 
 
Independence 
Buyer dependence=Supplier dependence 
 
Low mutual dependence:  
Buyer dependence and supplier dependence  
is low 
 
Supplier dominance 
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Buyer dependence < Supplier dependence 
 
Low buyer’s and high supplier dependence 
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Literature shows that including relative power as a determinant factor is reasonable (Parente et al., 
2004), and that ERAs tend to be used by buyers with supplier leverage (Emiliani, 2005; Tassabehji et 
al., 2006) in order to utilise their power position (Caniëls & Raaij, 2009) that is implicitly present in 
ERAs (Tassabehji, 2010). The relative power and dependence situation is critical in purchasing 
strategy choice (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2005). Successful buyers should have relative power (Cox, 
1999; Cox et al., 2001), and more power means more supplier pressure to exert (Porter, 1985). 
Indeed, in asymmetric relationships the least dependent party dominates the exchange (Buchanan, 
1992). In case of buyer domination, this creates opportunities for exploiting transactional market 
relationships (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011; Williamson, 1979, 1981, 2002). As power influences the 
ERA decision making process and ERAs are imposed in buyer dominated situations (Tassabehji, 2010), 
ERA usage is more likely in a situation of buyer dominance. Through this line of reasoning, one can 
hypothesize that procurement professionals are ever more likely to use an ERA in a situation where 
net dependence is shifting in their favour. Conversely argued, in a situation of supplier dominance, 
the option for using an ERA is less likely. Through this line of reasoning, one can hypothesize that 
procurement professionals are ever less likely to use an ERA in a situation where the net dependence 
is shifting in favour of the supplier. This means that visually, when moving from a position on the 
right bottom side towards a position on the left top side of figure 1, buyer dependence decreases 
and supplier dependence increases continuously. Ultimately, one transfers from a situation with high 
buyer and low supplier dependence towards a situation of low buyer and high supplier dependence. 
Through this line of reasoning, one can hypothesize that buyers are ever more likely to perceive ERA 
appropriateness in a situation where net dependence is shifting in their favour. 
 
H₅: “Buyer’s net dependence has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
 
Through the same reasoning and literature, that has led to the fifth hypothesis, one can hypothesize 
that procurement professionals are ever less likely to use ERAs, if total interdependence increases. 
Conversely argued, buyers are ever more likely to use ERAs, if total interdependence decreases. TCE 
explains this argument because, as buyer-supplier dependency increases, hierarchy (i.e. face-to-face 
negotiations) replaces transactional market relationships (i.e. ERAs) (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011; 
Williamson, 1979, 1981, 2002). Gelderman (2003) cites Heide (1994) in arguing that TCE parallels 
Resource Dependence Theory, in viewing non-market governance as a response to dependency 
(Gelderman, 2003; Heide, 1994). As total interdependence refers to relationship intensity (Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2007), and higher total interdependence typifies strong cooperative long-term 
investment needy relationships with mutual trust and commitment (Geyskens et al., 1996), it is likely 
that a buyer deems a situation of high total interdependency ERA unfitting. If the buyer has a high 
degree of dependency, the supplier has a high degree of power and can retaliate (Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2007). This means that visually, when moving from a position on the left bottom side 
towards a position on the right top side of figure 1, total interdependence and both buyer and 
supplier dependence increase continuously. Ultimately, one transfers from a position with low 
mutual dependency towards a position of high mutual dependency. Through this line of reasoning, 
one can hypothesize that buyers are ever less likely to perceive ERA appropriateness in a situation 
where total interdependence is increasing. 
 
H₆: “Total interdependence has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness”. 
 
 
2.7 Control variables and conceptual model  
 
Tassabehji (2010) argued that the private and public sectors have diverse procurement strategies and 
objectives (Tassabehji, 2010). Although private and public sector purchasing is increasingly similar, 
strategic goals, strategies and objectives can be different, though not mutually inadequate or 
inappropriate per se (Murray, 2001). Nevertheless, the way in which public and private sector 
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organisations procure goods and services can differ, not in the least since public sector institutions 
have to deal with more constraining regulations, e.g. Federal Acquisition Regulations in the USA and 
directives for public procurement in the EU, that support competitive bidding and the use of ERAs 
and provide guidelines for ERAs (Tadelis, 2012). Soudry (2004) argues that EU directives even further 
ERA use as a practice to award contracts efficiently and transparently (Soudry, 2004). Nevertheless, 
private as well as public sector institutions can both intensively use ERAs as part of their 
procurement operations (Wyld, 2010). In the present study’s empirical research, the Private and 
public sector dichotomy (PPS) is a first control variable. Schoenherr and Mabert (2011) posit that 
literature shows that organisation size is a key variable in explaining technology adoption and 
proactive innovation of technologies. With an increase in company size, perceived ERA 
appropriateness should increase (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011). During this study’s empirical 
research, the total number of employees is used as a proxy for Organisation size (OS) (McDade, Oliva, 
& Pirsch, 2002), as a second control variable. It is important to also consider potential differences in 
current, former and non-users of ERAs (Hawkins et al., 2010; Tassabehji, 2010), so Usage history is 
the third control variable. 
 
Six hypotheses are set and the conceptual framework with relevant factors is depicted in figure 2. 
The theoretical expectations, to be tested in the empirical study, are visualised in the model and are 
the basis for answering the problem statement. All six independent variables are presumed to have a 
direct causal relationship with the dependent variable, Perceived ERA appropriateness. As one can 
see, the impact of the variables Contractual governance, Relational governance, Buyer’s net 
dependence and Total interdependence on Perceived ERA appropriateness, visualised in the model, 
are enrichments intended to contribute to the body of knowledge about ERAs. 
 
Figure 2 Conceptual model  
 
  
H₁ - 
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
Asset specificity 
Non-contractibility 
Contractual governance 
Relational governance 
Total interdependence 
Buyer’s net dependence 
H₂ - 
H₃ + 
H₄ - 
H₅ - 
H₆ - 
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3. Methodology 
 
 
 
This chapter deals with the steps and decisions made in the study’s methodology. The methodology 
is accommodated towards answering the problem statement and research questions. The chapter 
elucidates on how the research is designed, how data is collected, how relevant conceptual 
definitions and variables are operationalised into concrete measures and measurement scales, how 
the data analysis takes place and how the subjects of validity and reliability are sufficiently secured. 
 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
In this study, the testing of theory takes place through the testing of the 6 hypotheses depicted in the 
conceptual model, in figure 2. Existing literature has allowed hypotheses setting, and as such, this 
study concerns quantitative research in which theoretical expectations in these hypotheses are 
tested empirically. The data collection in the empirical research takes place through a survey 
amongst a random sample of respondents, using a written questionnaire. Since this research is about 
theory testing, a quantitative method like a written survey is suitable. Harwell (2011) argues that 
quantitative research methods attempt to maximise objectivity, replicability, generalisability and 
predictability of research results. A key instrument to conduct quantitative studies is collecting data 
through surveys and testing hypotheses statistically (Harwell, 2011). Check and Schutt (2012) argue 
that survey research deals with data collection from a variety of persons, through their answers to 
questions asked. They state that surveys are acknowledged for their versatility, efficiency, and 
generalisability. This means that surveys can be utilised in many settings and that a large number of 
variables can be measured without substantially increasing costs. Surveys also provide an 
opportunity to probability sampling from large populations, which is essential if a representative 
view and generalisability are research goals (Check & Schutt, 2012).  
 
 
3.2 Data collection 
 
In order to test the 6 hypotheses empirically, a survey through a written questionnaire is held among 
Dutch procurement professionals. These procurement professionals are professionally involved in a 
B2B setting. By means of an electronic survey questionnaire with different operationalised measures, 
compiled using SurveyMonkey online software, a sample is performed amongst organisations in the 
Netherlands. This sample has a balanced sampling split towards both the public sector and private 
sector. The respondents can easily and quickly complete the questionnaire through internet.  
 
The sampling frame consists of a current and accurate set of 1,702 organisations in the Netherlands, 
formed by two subsets. The first subset consists of a list of 805 private sector organisations. Their 
data was downloaded during February 2014 from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce website (KvK, 
2014). The range selection was set on all organisations with economic activity and more than 300 
full-time employees. The second subset consists of a list of 897 public sector institutions. Their data 
was downloaded during February 2014 from the Dutch Government’s websites Overheid.nl for 
government administrations2 (Overheid.nl, 2014), DUO.nl for educational and research institutions 
(DUO, 2014) and the Dutch association of hospitals’ website for general, specialised and academic 
hospitals (NVZ, 2014). For the public sector institutions no minimum number of full-time employees 
was available and applied. The quantitative empirical research is performed on a randomly sorted list 
                                                 
2 advisory bodies, independent administrative bodies, government agencies, municipalities, ministries, provinces, judiciary 
institutions, police, fire departments, regional cooperation bodies and water boards 
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of these 1,702 organisations. Through LinkedIn, procurement professionals at these organisations are 
invited for the survey. After finding the organisation, personal invitations are sent to officials with 
one of the terms CPO, purchasing director, procurement director, supply chain director, procurement 
manager, purchasing manager, supply chain manager, purchaser, procurement advisor and purchase 
advisor (or Dutch equivalents) in their function name. Because all targeted respondents are above 
operational purchasing level, it qualifies them for informed answers. This method contains random 
factors in the sample composition and is consistent with generalisability as this method attains an 
appropriate sample size and diversity for this study’s purposes (Geringer, Frayne, & Milliman, 2002; 
Teagarden et al., 1995) of understanding professional attitudes towards ERA appropriateness. The 
search function in LinkedIn is set on location in the Netherlands, and the current organisation of the 
LinkedIn member is set on the organisation from the sampling frame. 
 
The invitations are sent to the respondents with personal salutations. In order to ensure content 
validity of the survey, and to make sure that respondents are able to properly understand the survey, 
as advised by Krosnick and Presser (2010) and Check and Schutt (2012), the draft version of the 
questionnaire was evaluated and pretested on readability, comprehensibility and correct translation 
(Check & Schutt, 2012; Krosnick & Presser, 2010) by three academically trained procurement 
professionals and an academically trained native English speaker with Dutch language skills. The 
content of the final online version of the questionnaire is shown in appendix B. The proper technical 
operation of the online version was tested by a four-person pilot group. The invitation provides the 
research objectives. Besides asking for the respondents’ contribution and mentioning why the study 
is valuable, an attempt is made to maximise the response rate. This is done by offering to send a 
copy of the research summary as well as the chance to win one of two tablets to be raffled, providing 
that the respondent has completed the survey questionnaire. Sending invitations is done 
incrementally until sufficient buyers have completed usable survey responses. The procurement 
professionals are questioned on their experiences, perceptions and opinions concerning ERAs within 
their organisation. The procurement professionals are given confidentiality and anonymity 
guarantees, and the promise of non-attribution of responses. All targeted respondents are given a 
friendly reminder after approximately two weeks to engage and answer or are thanked for 
participating if they had already responded. In order to ensure correct invitations and reminders, the 
draft versions of the invitation and reminder are evaluated on readability and comprehensibility by 
the procurement professionals as well. The contents of the final versions of the invitation and 
reminder are shown in appendix C. 
 
 
3.3 Operationalisation 
 
The conceptual framework in figure 2 shows the 6 independent variables Asset specificity, Non-
contractibility, Contractual governance, Relational governance, Buyer’s net dependence and Total 
interdependence that are expected to have a direct causal relationship with the dependent variable, 
Perceived ERA appropriateness. In order to avoid measurement issues, the operationalised 
measurements used in the questionnaire are all based on validated measurement scales, which have 
been used in other studies (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1999). As the conceptual model shows this 
study focuses on the 7 key concepts underneath.  
 
Survey respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreement, with various statements related 
to a single recent sourcing process. Summated rating scales are used to operationalise multi-item 
constructs. Answering is possible for respondents, by either choosing one of a set of given options, or 
choosing a position on a 5-point Likert-scale, from strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree until 
strongly agree. This enables correct validity and reliability of responses (Matell & Jacoby, 1971; 
Preston & Colman, 2000). Appendix A contains a comprehensive synopsis of origins of the 
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operationalisations of items and constructs, including variables, original statements, scales and 
sources (table 9). Underneath, the origins of operationalisation of the relevant items and constructs 
are discussed in outline. The questionnaire contains 2 questions concerning the control variables.  
 
Perceived ERA appropriateness is operationalised as a first order construct, consisting of 4 items, for 
which the respondents are asked for their opinions in the survey. This construct is based on Hawkins 
et al. (2009, p. 70). All independent variables are first or second order constructs and the dependent 
variable is a first order construct. All questions are closed questions. The number of questions asked 
and propositions posited, including the questions about Perceived ERA appropriateness, total 43, 
which is a number that is not too high for a high response rate as well as suitable for a small drop-out 
rate (Ganassali, 2008). In order to minimise the dropout rate the 43 questions and propositions are 
not presented separately, but are instead spread across 9 digital pages about the relevant variables 
(Check & Schutt, 2012; Ganassali, 2008).  
 
Asset specificity is operationalised as a first order construct, consisting of 3 items, for which the 
respondents are asked for their opinions in the survey, on buyer specific supplier investments, buyer 
specific supplier skills, and supplier customer knowledge. All 3 Asset specificity items mentioned are 
based on the combined validated supplier related Asset specificity items with sufficient factor 
loadings in Mithas et al. (2008, p. 724) and all of these items are measured on a 5-point Likert-scale 
(Mithas et al., 2008). Non-contractibility is operationalised as a first order construct, based on 13 
items, for which the respondents are asked for their opinions in the survey, on supplier technological 
investments, supplier information sharing, supplier responsiveness, supplier trustworthiness, and 
supplier flexibility. All 13 Non-contractibility items mentioned are based on the combined validated 
supplier related Non-contractibility items with sufficient factor loadings in Mithas et al. (2008, pp. 
709, 723-724), and all of these 13 items are measured on a 5-point Likert-scale (Mithas et al., 2008).  
 
Contractual governance is operationalised as a first order construct, consisting of 4 items, for which 
the respondents are asked for their opinions in the survey, on contract detail, responsibility 
adherence, non-performance sanctions, and organisational protection. All 4 Contractual governance 
items mentioned are based on Andaleeb (1995, p. 170) and all of these 4 items are measured on a 5-
point Likert-scale (Andaleeb, 1995). Relational governance is operationalised as a first order 
construct, consisting of 9 items, for which the respondents are asked for their opinions in the survey, 
on the three relational norm types (Macneil, 1983, 2000) exchange relationship flexibility, 
information exchange and solidarity. All 9 Relational governance items are based on Heide and John 
(1992, p. 37) and all of these 9 items are measured on a 5-point Likert-scale (Heide & John, 1992).  
 
Buyer’s net dependence is operationalised as a second order construct, based on 2 first order 
constructs. Buyer’s net dependence is measured as the difference between Buyer dependence and 
Supplier dependence. In a formula, this can be noted as: “Buyer’s net dependence = Buyer 
dependence - Supplier dependence”. This formula is based on Caniëls and Gelderman (2010, p. 252). 
The first order construct Buyer dependence consists of 4 items, for which the respondents are asked 
for their opinions in the survey, on the buyer’s cost of losing a supplier, the difficulty of replacing a 
supplier, the need for a supplier’s expertise, and dependence on a supplier. All 4 Buyer dependence 
items mentioned are based on Caniëls and Gelderman (2010, p. 252), and all of these 4 items are 
measured on a 5-point Likert-scale. The first order construct Supplier dependence consists of 4 items, 
for which the respondents are asked for their opinions in the survey, on the supplier’s cost of losing 
the buyer, the supplier’s difficulty of replacing the buyer, the supplier’s need for the buyer’s 
expertise, and the supplier’s dependence on the buyer. All 4 Supplier dependence items mentioned 
are based on Caniëls and Gelderman (2010, p. 252) and all of these 4 items are measured on a 5-
point Likert-scale (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010). Total interdependence is operationalised as a second 
order construct, based on 2 first order constructs. Total interdependence is measured as the sum of 
Buyer dependence and Supplier dependence. In a formula, this can be noted as: “Total 
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interdependence = Buyer dependence + Supplier dependence”. This formula is based on Caniëls and 
Gelderman (2010, p. 252). The first order constructs Buyer dependence and Supplier dependence are 
exactly as mentioned in the previous paragraph on Buyer’s net dependence (Caniëls & Gelderman, 
2010).  
 
As described in section 1.2, the buyers are questioned on their experiences, perceptions and 
opinions concerning ERAs. In this study the buyer-supplier relationship, for a focal product (group) 
sourced recently, is the unit of analysis. This is similar to the studies of Mithas et al. (2008), Parente 
et al. (2004) and Schoenherr and Mabert (2011) (Mithas et al., 2008; Parente et al., 2004; Schoenherr 
& Mabert, 2011). This means that the questionnaire starts with asking the procurement professional 
to take one recent sourcing project in mind, and keep this sourcing project in mind while answering 
the entire questionnaire. In effect, all the answers relate to this focal sourcing project.  
 
Wyld (2011) argues that one of the best models to determine whether any product (group) can be 
reverse-auctioned, is a two-dimensional model along the axes “degree of rivalry between suppliers 
(to ensure competition)” and “specifiability of the good or service in question (to ensure that the 
competition is on an “apples to apples” basis)” (Wyld, 2011). Through literature, there seems to be 
consensus that moderate product complexity, a non-strategic nature and product standardisation 
are conditions for using ERAs (Kumar & Maher, 2008; Lösch & Lambert, 2007; Puschmann & Alt, 
2005). The focal product (group) best used here are so-called leverage products. This is because 
leverage products, in the similarly titled Kraljic matrix quadrant (Kraljic, 1983), are most likely to be 
tendered usefully. This is because it is customary for leverage products with high profit impact and 
low supply risk to utilise buying power in the purchasing process (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2005; 
Gelderman & Weele, 2003). This means that survey respondents in the present study are asked for 
their opinions in relation to a current sourcing project for leverage products. Since it seems clear that 
it takes more than one supplier to have a sensible ERA, one has to keep in mind that in this study 
respondents cannot comment on one dyadic buyer-supplier relationship alone. Mithas et al. (2008) 
have ensured in their study, that the procurement professionals estimated all aspects in relation to 
the focal sourcing project ERA’s participating suppliers and ERA’s winning supplier (Mithas et al., 
2008). This empirical study asks the same of its respondents. This assumes market knowledge on 
behalf of the procurement professionals. Gelderman (2003) argues that asking respondents to assess 
buyer dependence on a supplier, and a supplier dependence on the buyer is possible without 
significant validity issues. This is because expert respondents, i.e. procurement professionals, have 
no trouble assessing dependence (Gelderman, 2003). 
 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
The empirical study has a quantitative character, which means that statistical techniques are used for 
the data analysis. Since the conceptual model contains 6 explanatory variables and 1 dependent 
variable, and relationships are presumed to be linear, multiple regression is the appropriate 
statistical analysis instrument (Koop, 2009). Field (2013) suggests multiple regression as the 
appropriate model for a single dependent variable with continuous scale outcome (e.g. a multi-item 
construct based upon items measured on an ordinal scale) with multiple independent variables with 
continuous scale outcomes (e.g. a multi-item constructs based upon items measured on an ordinal 
scale) (Field, 2013). Multiple regression enables determining the overall model fit (explained 
variance). Since the conceptual model only contains direct relationships, and no moderating or 
mediating relationships, SPSS multiple regression analysis supports the required statistical 
calculations for the multiple regression analysis (Pallant, 2005). The online survey platform 
SurveyMonkey facilitates exporting the respondents’ data, after which the data is processed in SPSS. 
The model is mathematically expressed as a simplified notation of a multiple regression equation 
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Y=α+β₁×X₁+β₂×X₂+β₃×X₃+β₄×X₄+β₅×X₅+β₆×X₆+ε. 3  Numerous rules of thumb are suggested to 
determine the minimum sample size required to conduct multiple regression analyses Green (1991). 
However, literature does not provide a consistent answer to what the sufficient number of 
respondents is. If k is the number of independent variables (in this study k=6) in a multiple regression 
analysis, Harris (1985) recommends a sample size of n≥50+k (i.e. n≥56), Nunnally (1978) and Combs 
(2010) a sample size of n≥100, Green (1991) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) a sample size of 
n≥50+8k (i.e. n≥98), and Stevens (1996) a sample size of n≥15k (i.e. n≥90) (Combs, 2010; Green, 
1991; Harris, 1985; Nunnally, 1978; Stevens, 1996; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The safest option is to 
choose n≥100, the highest minimum sample size mentioned in these sources. 
 
 
3.5 Validity, reliability and non-response 
 
In order to ensure that the results are correct, the empirical measurements must be valid and 
reliable. In this context, the concepts of internal validity, external validity and reliability are 
important. Internal validity deals with the degree to which a measurement measures what it seeks to 
measure, external validity deals with the phenomenon of generalisability and reliability deals with 
the issue of precision. The question is whether the study results can be generalised towards the 
population, based on the study’s sample. In this study, all used measurement scales are already 
validated by and used in other studies. For this reason, no major issues concerning internal validity 
are expected. An analysis is performed in the next chapter, in order to determine Cronbach’s alpha 
for all relevant variables. In order to make sure that there is no multicollinearity, the data is checked 
for correlations between the independent variables larger than 0,8 or smaller than -0,8, and if so 
appropriate measures are taken. Significance is tested at a 95% reliability standard, with all 
remaining variables, through a multiple linear regression analysis, at a p-value of 5%, whilst using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The R-square, f-values and p-values are mentioned. It is 
unfortunately not possible to determine the potentially harmful effects of non-response because of 
the incremental respondent-contacting method that is used in this study. By using this individual 
contacting method, it is not possible to determine the time it takes responses to come in. For that 
reason, it is not possible to get an evaluation as suggested by Armstrong and Overton (1977), of 
differences between the first response half of the survey results and the second response half of the 
survey results, with the latter serving as a proxy for non-respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). 
  
                                                 
3 Y=Perceived ERA appropriateness (PEA)  α=constant for Perceived ERA appropriateness 
X₁=Asset specificity (AS)     β₁=coefficient for Asset specificity 
X₂=Non-contractibility (NC)    β₂=coefficient for Non-contractibility 
X₃=Contractual governance (CG)   β₃=coefficient for Contractual governance 
X₄=Relational governance (RG)    β₄=coefficient for Relational governance 
X₅=Buyer’s net dependence (BND)   β₅=coefficient for Buyer’s net dependence 
X₆=Total interdependence (TI)    β₆=coefficient for Total interdependence 
ε=disturbance term  
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4. Results 
 
 
 
This chapter deals with the results found in the empirical research and the data analysis. It answers 
the problem statement and research questions and clarifies the statistical limitations of the study. 
 
 
4.1 Empirical findings 
 
As described in the previous chapter, a survey was held amongst a random sample of respondents. 
The sample had a balanced sampling split towards public and private sector organisations. 
Purchasing professionals were contacted during February and March 2014. Contact was made 
through e-mail as this is a more direct communication method than LinkedIn’s inbox, which some 
professionals will not use actively. Purchasing professionals that indicated to decline the survey 
invitation, indicated to have participated, indicated to want to receive a research summary, indicated 
to be on maternity leave or to be indefinitely absent or enrolled in the raffle were not sent a 
reminder. The contacting method had an incremental nature and contacting additional professionals 
was ceased after the moment sufficient completed responses were obtained. A total of 1,039 
questionnaire invitations and 956 reminders were sent. In order to work with the exact public private 
sector dichotomy as described in section 3.2, two identical questionnaires were created online for 
the respondents from both the private and the public sectors and both datasets were combined to 
include this private public sector dichotomy. Table 1 shows the survey’s distribution characteristics. 
 
Table 1 Survey’s sector distribution characteristics  
Sector Organisations in 
sample frame 
Organisations 
in sample 
Sample organisations 
without professionals 
on LinkedIn 
Sample organisations 
with professionals 
on LinkedIn 
Professionals 
contacted  
through LinkedIn 
Private  805 206 108 98 742 
Public  897 242 132 110 297 
Total 1,702 448 240 208 1,039 
 
 
From the 1,039 invitees, 259 complete responses were received, representing a response rate of 
24.9%. Of these 259 responses, 11 responses were discarded because of their outlying characteristics 
on processing time and 5 were discarded because of their outlying characteristics on lack of response 
scattering. The SurveyMonkey platform anonymously registers the processing time each respondent 
takes to complete the questionnaire. The median time taken for the survey was just under 7 minutes 
and the 95% majority of respondents needed 4 to 18 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Eleven 
responses completed in less than 3 minutes were discarded on grounds of lack of processing 
duration. In addition, it turned out that some respondents had answered monotonously (e.g. neutral 
on all answers). Five further responses had to be deleted on grounds of non-scattered answering. 
The statistical analyses in SPSS were consequently run on data from 243 remaining complete and 
useable responses, obviously more than the required minimum set on 100 complete responses. All 
statements in the questionnaire were formulated in such a way that their orientation was positive for 
all items, pre-empting inversion and recoding of response. The data collection has taken place 
through an electronic platform, and the data has not been entered manually into SPSS. Any outliers 
from expected value ranges were therefore highly unlikely. Nevertheless the data set was checked in 
SPSS for possible outliers, through the descriptive statistics analysis with a focus on frequencies, and 
minimum and maximum values in the dataset. This whilst keeping in mind that variable PPS would 
have to show either 0 for Private or 1 for Public, variables OS and UH either 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, and all 
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items of the dependent variable and independent variables either 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 since they were all 
measured on a 5-point Likert-scale. No irregularities were found.  
 
More than two-thirds (71.2%) of the respondents resided in the private sector (see table 2), and 
almost two-thirds (65.8%) in the top category of organisation size (>1,000 employees). Less than one-
tenths (8.2%) of the respondents resided in the two categories with the smallest number of 
employees (<200 employees) (see table 3). This last figure was expected since the private sector 
companies in the sample frame were selected on having at least 300 full-time employees. More than 
six-tenths (61.3%) of procurement professionals indicated to be working in organisations without any 
experience with ERAs (149 out of 243) (see table 4). The comprehensive descriptive statistics, with 
absolute and relative frequencies of response options, can be found in table 10 in appendix D. 
 
Table 2 Private and public sector dichotomy (PPS) control variable 
Sector Frequency Percent 
Private  173 71.2 
Public  70 28.8 
Total 243 100.0 
N=243 
 
Table 3 Organisation size (OS) control variable 
Size Frequency Percent 
< 100 full-time employees 9 3.7 
100 - 200 full-time employees 11 4.5 
201 - 500 full-time employees 26 10.7 
501 - 1,000 full-time employees 37 15.2 
> 1,000 full-time employees 160 65.8 
Total 243 100.0 
N=243 
 
Table 4 Current, former and non-users of ERAs (UH) control variable 
Usage Frequency Percent 
Non usage 149 61.3 
Trial usage 27 11.1 
Low usage 47 19.3 
High usage 15 6.2 
Past usage 5 2.1 
Total 243 100.0 
N=243 
 
 
4.2 Statistical analysis 
 
All constructs were measured with validated lists of questions and statements, closely following 
previous studies. Nevertheless, a factor analysis was performed on all variables. This was done per 
variable and by using the SPSS dimension reduction factor analysis functionality, through the 
principal component analysis extraction method with Varimax rotation. Items NC1, NC4, CG3, RG3, 
RG5, RG8, SD3 and SD4 were discarded from further analysis because of their factor loadings of less 
than .500 (Hulland, 1999; Nunnally, 1978). The remaining 33 items all had factor loadings over .500. 
The factor loadings per item of the initial factor analysis can be found in table 11 in appendix E. 
 
Internal consistency of a scale is an important aspect of reliability. This means that all items within a 
scale should be coherent. An indicator should only be part of a dimension if the Cronbach’s α with 
this item is high enough (Pallant, 2005). Only then is the relevance of this indicator to the other 
indicators of the dimension sufficiently consistent. In fact, any indicator that causes a Cronbach’s α 
smaller than .600 should be discarded from the construct (Field, 2013; Pallant, 2005). Obviously all 
scales used within this research were already validated in other studies. Nevertheless, the reliability 
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of a scale can be dependent upon the sample it is used for, and therefore all scales were checked for 
reliability. The reliability analysis was performed per dimension by using the SPSS scale reliability 
analysis functionality, including inter-item correlations and descriptives for the scale if item deleted. 
During the reliability analysis, it is tested whether the scores on different items are coherent and can 
therefore be merged meaningfully. This means that average scores on same-construct items should 
be roughly the same, same-construct item intercorrelations should be at least .200, and Cronbach’s α 
has a minimum of .600 (Field, 2013; Pallant, 2005). All these standards were met, with the exception 
of 2 items of the Non-contractibility dimension (NC12 and NC13) and 1 item of the Relational 
governance dimension (RG2), which were consequently discarded. With a Cronbach’s α of at least 
.711 on all variables, it can be concluded that all scales are sufficiently internally coherent and 
reliable for further research. The comprehensive reliability analysis can be found in tables 13 until 22 
in appendix G. After the discarding of the three items NC12, NC 13 and RG2 in the reliability analysis, 
a second factor analysis was performed (see table 12 in appendix F). Items NC2, NC3, NC6, NC7, 
NC11, and RG1 were also discarded because of a factor loading under .500. After the discarding of 
the six items NC2, NC3, NC6, NC7, NC11, and RG1 in the second factor analysis, a second reliability 
analysis was performed (see tables 23 until 32 in appendix H). This second reliability analysis has not 
lead to any further item-discarding. An overview of the final Cronbach’s α-values from the reliability 
analysis of the relevant variables is shown in table 5. 
 
Table 5 Results reliability analysis of (in)dependent variables 
Variable Number of final items Cronbach’s α 
PEA 4 .837 
AS 3 .711 
NC 4 .832 
CG 3 .724 
RG 4 .751 
BD 4 .784 
SD 2 .738 
N=243 
 
After the reliability was guaranteed, the variable constructs were calculated. This was done in SPSS 
with the transform and compute variable functionality. The score of the variable is the sum of its 
items’ scores. Please keep in mind that, in section 3.3, it was explained that BND=BD-SD and that 
TI=BD+SD. The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and independent variables from the 
conceptual model can be found in table 6. 
 
Table 6 Descriptive statistics on dependent variable and independent variables4 
Variable Construct 
items 
Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
PEA 4 4 19 9.21 9 3.288 
AS 3 3 15 9.44 9 2.307 
NC 4 8 20 14.45 15 2.426 
CG 3 5 15 10.61 11 2.079 
RG 4 6 20 15.14 16 2.225 
BND 6 -6 14 3.94 4 2.966 
TI 6 6 28 17.93 18 3.441 
N=243 
  
                                                 
4 With the remaining items: 
- The PEA construct theoretical maximum value is 20 (=4×5) and theoretical minimum value is 4 (=4×1). 
- The AS construct theoretical maximum value is 15 (=3×5) and theoretical minimum value is 3 (=3×1). 
- The NC construct theoretical maximum value is 20 (=4×5) and theoretical minimum value is 4 (=4×1). 
- The CG construct theoretical maximum value is 15 (=3×5) and theoretical minimum value is 3 (=3×1). 
- The RG construct theoretical maximum value is 20 (=4×5) and theoretical minimum value is 4 (=4×1). 
- The BND construct theoretical maximum value is 18 (=20-2) and theoretical minimum value is -6 (=4-10). 
- The TI construct theoretical maximum value is 30 (=20+10) and theoretical minimum value is 6 (=4+2). 
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In order to control the potential risk of multicollinearity between the independent variables in the 
conceptual model, all correlations between the independent variables have been calculated. There 
should be no inter-independent variable correlations higher than .700 or lower than -.700 (Field, 
2013; Pallant, 2005). This check on multicollinearity was done with the SPSS bivariate correlations 
analysis functionality. All inter-independent variable correlations have met the standard to be 
between -.700 and .700, with the highest inter-independent variable correlation at .596. Therefore 
multicollinearity seems to be no issue in this particular sample. Table 7 shows the bivariate 
correlations between all independent variables. 
 
Table 7 Bivariate correlations (Pearson) between independent variables 
Variable AS NC CG RG BND TI 
AS 1      
NC .178** 1     
CG .241** .051 1    
RG .153* .431** .140* 1   
BND .248** -.010 .161* -.043 1  
TI .395** .045 .304** .187** .596** 1 
N=243, * significance at 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** significance at 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
An assumption to check before performing a multiple regression analysis is the normal distribution of 
the individual variables. Histograms are typically used for checking this normality (Pallant, 2005). The 
histograms are made with the SPSS descriptive statistics functionality. In figure 4 until figure 10 in 
appendix I, the 7 histograms are shown of all 7 variables from the conceptual model. As one can see 
the histograms largely indicate normality. Nevertheless, one can also see some striking anomalies in 
the histograms of variables PEA, AS, NC and RG. 
 
Another assumption to check before performing a multiple regression analysis is the assumption of 
linearity between variables. Scatter plots are typically used for checking the relation between two 
continuous variables since scatter plots indicate linearity, strength and polarity of the relation 
(positive or negative) between variables (Pallant, 2005). The scatter plots are made with the SPSS 
simple scatterplot graphs functionality. In appendix J, the 6 scatterplots with PEA and each of the 6 
independent variables are shown in figure 11 until figure 17, preceded by a matrix scatter plot of all 7 
variables from the conceptual model. As one can see the scatter plots do not indicate any curvilinear 
relationships. Unfortunately, the points are not scattered in a clearly recognisable cigar-like shape 
and this indicates weak relations between the independent variables and the dependent variables. 
 
In section 2.7, three control variables were discussed: Organisation size, Usage history and the Public 
private sector dichotomy. This was done in order to check, separately from the conceptual model 
itself, whether there are relationships between each of these control variables and the variables in 
the conceptual model. The relationship between Organisation size and the dependent variable is 
tested by a variance analysis since the first is measured on a nominal scale and the second is 
constantly measured on a quantitative scale. This is also the case for Usage history. The relationship 
between the Public private sector dichotomy and the dependent variables is tested by a T-test since 
the first is a dichotomous variable and the second is constantly measured on a quantitative scale 
(Field, 2013; Pallant, 2005). 
 
In order to check if there is a significant difference on scores on the conceptual framework’s 
variables between organisations from either the private or the public sector (control variable), a 
series of T-tests was performed. The T-tests were performed with the use of the SPSS compare 
means independent samples T-test functionality at a 95% confidence interval level. In this sample, 
the T-test showed significantly higher scores on the means of the independent variables Asset 
specificity, Contractual governance, Buyer’s net dependence and Total interdependence for the 
private sector in comparison to the public sector. No significant different means were found on the 
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independent variables Non-contractibility and Relational governance and the dependent variable 
Perceived ERA appropriateness. Calculations of the T-test on PPS and the conceptual framework 
variables are listed in tables 33 and 34 in appendix K. 
 
In order to check if there is a significant relationship on scores of Perceived ERA appropriateness and 
Organisation size (control variable), a variance analysis series was performed. As stated in section 
2.7, the expectation is that with an increase in Organisation size, Perceived ERA appropriateness 
should increase. An Analysis Of VARiance (ANOVA) was performed with the use of SPSS’s compare 
means functionality. The variance analysis on this sample showed no significant relation between 
Organisation size and Perceived ERA appropriateness (F=.549, p=.700). Eta squared (η²) equals .009, 
which implies that only 0.9% of PEA is explained by OS. An ANOVA analysis has also been performed 
on the independent variables, and this analysis shows that there are no significant relations between 
Organisation size and each individual independent variable. The highest F-value was found for the 
relation between Organisation size and Buyer’s net dependence (F=1.259, p=.287). Here, η² equals 
.021 which implies that only 2.1% of BND is explained by OS. Details of these variance analyses are 
listed in tables 35 until 38 in appendix L. 
 
In order to establish a significant relation between Perceived ERA appropriateness and Usage history 
(control variable), a variance analysis series was performed. As stated in section 2.7, the expectation 
is inherent differences on PEA in current, former and non-users of ERAs. The variance analysis on this 
sample showed a significant relation between Usage history and Perceived ERA appropriateness 
(F=19.694, p=.000). Here, η² equals .249, which implies that 24.9% of PEA is explained by UH. An 
ANOVA analysis has also been performed on the independent variables, and this analysis shows that 
there are no significant relations between Usage history and each individual independent variable. 
The highest F-value was found for the relation between Usage history and Buyer’s net dependence 
(F=1.937, p=.105). Here, η² equals .032 which implies that only 3.2% of BND is explained by UH. 
Details of these variance analyses are listed in tables 39 until 42 in appendix M. 
 
In this study, a standard (also called simultaneous) multiple regression was performed, which means 
all independent variables entered the analysis at the same time (Field, 2013). Multiple regression is 
based on correlation and allows exploration of variable interrelationships, and shows how well a set 
of independent variables predict a dependent variable (Pallant, 2005). Multiple regression provides 
outcomes about the whole model (with all constructs included), and the contribution of each of the 
independent constructs (Field, 2013). The multiple regression analysis was performed with the SPSS 
linear regression analysis functionality. Significance was tested at a 95% reliability level. 
 
In table 43 in appendix N, the Pearson correlations between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable PEA indicate relatively weak relationships. The strongest Pearson correlation is 
between PEA and BND at -.173, yet all Pearson correlations between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable are less than the required standard of .300 (Pallant, 2005). The table shows 
that the correlation between PEA and BND is also the only significant Pearson correlation found. This 
is indicated by the p-value of .007, which is less than the required maximum of .050 (5%).  
 
Table 44 in appendix N shows an R²-value of .054. This means that only 5.4% of the variance in the 
dependent variable PEA can be explained by the independent variables AS, NC, CG, RG, BND and TI in 
the conceptual model. This means that other variables will have additional and substantial impact on 
PEA. Since this study works with a large sample, it is allowed to use the R²-value and not required to 
use the adjusted R²-value (Pallant, 2005). Table 45 in appendix N shows the results of the testing of 
the null-hypothesis that all B-values in the model are equal to each other and zero. Since the p-value 
equals .040 and because .040 is less than .050 (5%), this means that the null-hypothesis must be 
rejected, and that the result of the model is statistically significant. 
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Underneath, table 8 shows that from the independent variables of the model, variables BND has 
contributed the most to the prediction of the dependent variable PEA. This is based upon the highest 
score of BND (-.172) in the column β. These dimensionless same-scale standardised coefficients β 
allow the comparison of the contribution of each independent variable (Pallant, 2005). In order to 
check if these contributions are statistically significant unique contributions, one has to check the p-
value. If the p-value is less than .050, the particular variable is a significant unique contributor in 
predicting the dependent variable. This is only the case for BND (p=.034). 
 
Table 8 Results for multiple regression analysis of variables AS, NC, CG, RG, BND and TI 
 B 
coefficient 
Standard 
error for B 
β T-stat p-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
(Constant) 
AS 
NC 
CG 
RG 
BND* 
TI 
7.845 
.190 
.103 
-.038 
.005 
-.191 
-.047 
1.952 
.101 
.096 
.106 
.108 
.089 
.083 
 
.134 
.076 
-.024 
.003 
-.172 
-.049 
4.019 
1.889 
1.065 
-.355 
.047 
-2.138 
-.563 
.000 
.060 
.288 
.723 
.962 
.034 
.574 
4.000 
-.008 
-.087 
-.248 
-.208 
-.367 
-.211 
11.691 
.389 
.293 
.172 
.218 
-.015 
.117 
* Indicates significance at p < .050, N=243, F=2.238, R²=.054, p-value for testing R²=0 equals .040  
 
 
4.3 Hypothesis testing 
 
Hypothesis H₁ stated that AS has a negative impact on PEA. We could not find support for hypothesis 
H₁ in the empirical results (β=.134; p=.060). The value of β is positive and this means that the 
empirical results showed the opposite impact of AS on PEA than what was hypothesized. The results 
show that AS has a positive impact and not a negative impact on PEA. However this impact is not 
statistically significant. This means that hypothesis H₁ is not supported by the empirical results. 
Hypothesis H₂ stated that NC has a negative impact on PEA. We could not find support for hypothesis 
H₂ in the empirical results (β=.076; p=.288). The value of β is positive and this means that the 
empirical results showed the opposite impact of NC on PEA than what was hypothesized. The results 
show that NC has a positive impact and not a negative impact on PEA. However this impact is not 
statistically significant. This means that hypothesis H₂ is not supported by the empirical results. 
 
Hypothesis H₃ stated that CG has a positive impact on PEA. We could not find support for hypothesis 
H₃ in the empirical results (β=-.024; p=.723). The value of β is positive and this means that the 
empirical results showed the opposite impact of CG on PEA than what was hypothesized. The results 
show that CG has a negative and not a positive impact on PEA. However this impact is not statistically 
significant. This means that hypothesis H₃ is not supported by the empirical results. Hypothesis H₄ 
stated that RG has a negative impact on PEA. We could not find support for hypothesis H₄ in the 
empirical results (β=.003; p=.962). The value of β is positive and this means that the empirical results 
showed the opposite impact of RG on PEA than what was hypothesized. The results show that RG has 
a positive and not a negative impact on PEA. However this impact is virtually zero and not statistically 
significant. This means that hypothesis H₄ is not supported by the empirical results. 
 
Hypothesis H₅ stated that BND has a negative impact on PEA. We could find support for hypothesis 
H₅ in the empirical results (β=-.172; p=.034). The value of β is negative and this means that the 
empirical results showed the hypothesized impact of BND on PEA. The results show that BND has a 
negative impact on PEA. This impact is also statistically significant at the 95% level. This means that 
hypothesis H₅ is supported by the empirical results. Hypothesis H₆ stated that TI has a negative 
impact on PEA. We could not find support for hypothesis H₆ in the empirical results (β=-.049; 
p=.574). The value of β is negative and this means that the empirical results showed the 
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hypothesized impact of TI on PEA. However this impact is not statistically significant. This means that 
hypothesis H₆ is not supported by the empirical results. 
 
Figure 3 Conceptual model with multiple regression analysis results 
 
* Indicates significance at 95%-level, p < .050, N=243. 
 
 
H₁ - (β=.134; p=.060)  
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
Asset specificity 
Non-contractibility 
Contractual governance 
Relational governance 
Total interdependence 
Buyer’s net dependence 
H₂ - (β=.076; p=.288) 
H₃+(β=-.024; p=.723) 
H₄ - (β=.003; p=.962) 
H₅ - (β=-.172; p=.034)* 
H₆ - (β=-.049; p=.574) 
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5. Conclusions, discussion and recommendations 
 
 
 
This chapter deals with the main conclusions based upon the study’s summarised results, followed by 
a discussion about the empirical observations in relation to the theoretical expectations. The chapter 
concludes with managerial and academic recommendations and study limitations. 
 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
Section 1.1 demonstrated a lack of solid empirical research on ERA appropriateness (Saprikis, 2012), 
and few studies empirically examined determinant factors of ERA use (Mithas et al., 2008; 
Tassabehji, 2010). Many studies point out practical and academic needs for further empirical 
research into determinants of ERA appropriateness (Cox, 2004; Hawkins et al., 2010; Nadler & Kros, 
2010; Parente et al., 2004; Tassabehji, 2010; Yeniyurt et al., 2011). Buyer power has not been 
included in ERA studies as it is implicit and explicit in the literature that ERAs tend to be used by 
buyers with supplier leverage (Emiliani & Stec, 2005b; Tassabehji et al., 2006). This study aimed at a 
new perspective on determinants of perceived ERA appropriateness, by looking into suggested 
power and dependence links (Tassabehji, 2010). The argument that power and dependence in buyer-
supplier relationships should influence the decision making process that leads to using or not using 
ERAs has led to the problem statement: “What is the impact of power and dependence in buyer-
supplier relationships on procurement professionals’ perceived ERA appropriateness?”.  
 
The first additional research question was what power and dependence in buyer-supplier 
relationships exactly are. Caniëls and Gelderman (2007) defined the concepts of power and 
dependence along the lines of buyer dependence and supplier dependence. They argue that a 
buyer’s dependence on a supplier is a potential supplier power source and that the primary outcome 
of relative dependence is relative power (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). They conclude that studies 
clearly distinct relative power and total power, and join Pfeffer (1981) and Bacharach and Lawler 
(1981) in defining relative power and total power in terms of buyer dependence and supplier 
dependence. This means that the relative power of a party is the result of the net dependency on the 
other party (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007; Pfeffer, 1981).  
 
The second additional research question was how power and dependence in buyer-supplier 
relationships can be measured. Caniëls and Gelderman (2007) argue that buyer relative power is the 
difference between supplier dependence and buyer dependence and supplier relative power is the 
difference between buyer dependence and supplier dependence (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). They 
developed constructs for measuring buyer dependence and supplier dependence. The construct 
buyer dependence consists of four items on the buyer’s cost of losing the supplier, difficulty of 
replacing the supplier, need for the supplier’s expertise, and dependence on the supplier. The 
construct supplier dependence consists of four items on the supplier’s cost of losing the buyer, 
difficulty of replacing the buyer, need for the buyer’s expertise, and dependence on the buyer 
(Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010). 
 
The six carefully formulated hypotheses were tested via a multiple regression analysis with 
unexpected results. Firstly, no support was found in the empirical results for the hypothesis H₁ that 
asset specificity has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness (β=.134; p=.060). Secondly, 
no support was found in the empirical results for hypothesis H₂ that non-contractibility has a 
negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness (β=.076; p=.288). Thirdly, no support was found 
in the empirical results for hypothesis H₃ that contractual governance has a positive impact on 
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perceived ERA appropriateness (β=-.024; p=.723). Fourthly, no support was found in the empirical 
results for hypothesis H₄ that relational governance has a negative impact on perceived ERA 
appropriateness (β=.003; p=.962). Fifthly, significant empirical support was found for hypothesis H₅. 
This means that the study results actually showed that buyer net dependence does have a negative 
impact on perceived ERA appropriateness (β=-.172; p=.034). Finally, no support was found in the 
empirical results for hypothesis H₆ that total interdependence has a negative impact on perceived 
ERA appropriateness (β=-.049; p=.574).  
 
One can, therefore, conclude that, despite the extensive literature review, only one out of six 
expected relations between the conceptual framework’s factors was supported by this study’s 
results. Of the six independent variables for perceived ERA appropriateness, only buyer net 
dependence has significant explanatory power. The multiple regression analysis has yielded a R²-
value of .054. This means that only 5.4% of the variance in the dependent variable perceived ERA 
appropriateness can be explained by the independent variables asset specificity, non-contractibility, 
contractual governance, relational governance, buyer net dependence and total interdependence, in 
the nonetheless statistically significant conceptual model (p=.040).  
 
A T-test on the impact of the sector showed significantly higher scores on the means of the variables 
asset specificity, contractual governance, buyer’s net dependence and total interdependence for the 
private sector in comparison to the public sector. No significant differences were found for the 
variables non-contractibility, relational governance and perceived ERA appropriateness. A first 
variance analysis showed no significant relations between either organisation size and perceived ERA 
appropriateness or between organisation size and any of the independent variables (asset specificity, 
non-contractibility, contractual governance, relation governance, buyer net dependence and total 
interdependence). A second variance analysis showed a significant relation between both usage 
history and perceived ERA appropriateness, but no significant relations between usage history and 
any of the independent variables. 
 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
In this paragraph, the empirical observations are compared with the theoretical expectations. Five 
out of the six hypotheses were not supported at a level of 95% significance. For that reason several 
alternative analyses have been performed on subsets of the survey data, as described briefly in 
appendix O, albeit without a more comprehensive outcome in most cases. However, when a 
simultaneous multiple regression analysis was performed on only the respondents from the private 
sector (N=173) it resulted in a significant model (.046) with significant variables asset specificity 
(.030) and buyer net dependence (.012). In section 4.2 the T-test already showed significantly higher 
scores on the means of the independent variables asset specificity, contractual governance, buyer 
net dependence and total interdependence for the private sector in comparison to the public sector. 
One can conclude that there seems to be a difference between the private and public sector. 
 
Firstly, in regard to the theoretical expectation that asset specificity has a negative impact on 
perceived ERA appropriateness, no supporting results were found in the empirical research. This is in 
contrast with the contribution of Mithas et al. (2008). Their conceptual model dealt with explanatory 
power of asset specificity on perceived ERA appropriateness (Mithas et al., 2008). It is possible that 
their study resulted in different conclusions due to the different approach they have taken in their 
sampling. They have used responses from the US-automotive industry and asked about buyer-
supplier relationships for two categories of production goods (commodity and specialised types of 
production goods). This is obviously different from the leverage products sample approach through 
different sectors and industries that was used in the current study. Nevertheless, the expectation 
that higher asset specificity, defined as “the degree to which investment in a particular asset has 
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lower value in its next-best use” (Mithas et al., 2008; Williamson, 1979), would lead to increased 
perceived ERA appropriateness, as suggested in Malone et al. (1987) Electronic Market Hypothesis 
(Malone et al., 1987) is not supported by this study’s results. 
 
Similarly, in regard to the theoretical expectation that non-contractibility has a negative impact on 
perceived ERA appropriateness no supporting results were found in the empirical research as well. 
Once again, this is in contrast with Mithas et al. (2008). Their conceptual model and empirical results 
showed strongly significant explanatory power of non-contractibility on perceived ERA 
appropriateness (p<.01) (Mithas et al., 2008). Their different outcomes may once again be influenced 
by their sampling approach (US-automotive industry and commodity and specialised types of 
production goods), diverging from this study’s leverage products approach. Nevertheless, the 
expectation that higher non-contractibility, defined as “difficult-to-specify future investments that a 
firm may need to make to sustain a set of existing transactions or to initiate a new set of exchanges 
with the same partner” (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Mithas et al., 2008) would lead to increased 
perceived ERA appropriateness, as suggested by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993a) in their study (Bakos 
& Brynjolfsson, 1993a), is not supported by this study’s results. This means that for both hypotheses 
on which this study joined Mithas et al. (2008), this study’s outcomes do not support the conclusions 
of these authors. 
 
Thirdly, no supporting results were found in the empirical research for the theoretical expectation 
that contractual governance has a positive impact on perceived ERA appropriateness. This is in 
contrast with the literature study, wherein most notably Ferguson et al. (2005) suggested that 
organisations with a high priority on contractual governance prefer ERAs, compared to organisations 
that have a high priority on relational governance, who will prefer more cooperative exchanges than 
ERAs (Ferguson et al., 2005). Fourthly and likewise, no supporting results were found for the 
theoretical expectation that relational governance has a negative impact on perceived ERA 
appropriateness. Again, it is possible that the scenario-based approach in this study has influenced 
the outcome on the contractual governance and relational governance variables. Pearcy and 
Giunipero (2006) have suggested that governance structure development depends on the purchase 
category (Pearcy & Giunipero, 2006), and in this case a leverage product group was suggested as the 
focal sourcing project. 
 
Fifthly, supporting results were found in the empirical research for the theoretical expectation that 
buyer’s net dependence has a positive impact on perceived ERA appropriateness. This study, 
therefore, confirms that a buyer’s dependence on a supplier is a potential supplier power source 
(Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007) and that the least dependent party dominates the exchange (Buchanan, 
1992; Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Indeed, in a situation of supplier dominance, the option for using 
an ERA is less likely. This significant explanatory power of buyer net dependence on perceived ERA 
appropriateness is the core result of this study. It means that procurement professionals will favour 
ERAs in situations where they have less dependency on suppliers than vice versa and that 
procurement professionals will try to avoid ERAs or will prefer other sourcing methods than ERAs in 
circumstances where they have more dependency on suppliers than vice versa. Finally, no supporting 
results were found in the empirical research for the theoretical expectation that total 
interdependence has a negative impact on perceived ERA appropriateness. Therefore, the influence 
of dependence asymmetry seems to be larger than dependence magnitude. The study findings seem 
to underline the literature in such a way that ERAs tend to be used by buyers with supplier leverage 
(Emiliani, 2005; Tassabehji et al., 2006) in order to utilise their (net) power position (Caniëls & Raaij, 
2009). One can argue that questioning on total interdependence, whilst following a leverage-product 
scenario might not be an appropriate combination, as total interdependence seems to be unlikely for 
this type of product. 
 
  35 
The following findings should not be absent in the discussion about the results of this study. Firstly, 
the feedback from the respondents showed that more than six-tenths (61.3%) of procurement 
professionals in this study indicated to be working in organisations without any experience with 
ERAs. This might give rise to concerns about how they answered certain questions in the survey, 
about one specific sourcing process. If ERAs were, for whatever reason, never a realistic option in 
their organisation, it might have been difficult for these respondents to give well-founded judgments. 
In fact, chances are that answering might have been more related to general opinions about ERAs 
than related to one specific recent sourcing process. This concern was also expressed by a few 
respondents after completing the survey questionnaire.  
 
Secondly, it is striking that just one-tenth of the responses on the five-point Likert-scales was a 
strongly expressed view (4.3% strongly disagree, 6.3% strongly agree) and more than seven-tenths of 
response on the five-point Likert-scales showed a neutral or agreeing perception (26.5% neutral, 
43.9% agree). This seems to be demonstrated by the outliers mentioned in section 4.2. As one can 
see in appendix I, the histograms of variables perceived ERA appropriateness, asset specificity, non-
contractibility and relational governance show striking anomalies5. Even though, one would expect 
roughly the same answers on items that measure the same entity, it is remarkable to find a spreading 
this low. This makes it likely that the respondents did not have very outspoken views on the 
statements they had to answer on. Since the method of information gathering is based upon 
procurement professionals’ self-assessment, once again, even though all used measurement scales 
are already validated by and used in other studies, chances are that answering might have been 
more related to general opinions about ERAs than related to one specific recent sourcing process. It 
is not possible to estimate what the impact of giving general opinions, inaccurate reading or 
misinterpretation of the applicable scenario, or perhaps even hastiness or laziness (in relation to 
efficiently getting to the incentive), is on these findings. Already mentioned in section 3.5 is the fact 
that it was not possible to determine the potentially harmful effects of non-response as suggested by 
Armstrong and Overton (1977), due to the used incremental respondent-contacting method 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). 
 
Another notable difference between this study and literature is on the impact of organisation size on 
perceived ERA appropriateness. Mithas et al. (2008) found a very significant effect of firm size on the 
use of ERAs (p<.01) (Mithas et al., 2008), while this study could not chart a similar significant impact 
(p=.700). Another difference between these authors and this study’s findings was the absence of 
significant impact of relational governance on perceived ERA appropriateness, where Mithas et al. 
(2008) posited that, consistent with relational governance arguments, buyers with a relationship 
orientation to supply chain strategy are less likely to use reverse auctions than buyers that take a 
transaction orientation toward their suppliers (Mithas et al., 2008). Once again, there were 
differences in measurement, since Mithas et al. (2008) used automotive companies’ annual revenues 
as a proxy for organisation size, in contrast to the number of full-time equivalents in this study.  
  
 
5.3 Managerial recommendations 
 
In the first chapter the continuous use of ERAs in many industries was discussed (Aloini et al., 2012; 
Carter & Kaufmann, 2007; Jap, 2002; Schoenherr, 2008; Schoenherr & Mabert, 2011; Skjøtt-Larsen et 
al., 2003; Skjøtt-Larsen et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2003). Nonetheless, only a few studies examined the 
determinant factors of ERA use empirically (Mithas et al., 2008; Tassabehji, 2010). Even though 
                                                 
5 Most notable are the scores on perceived ERA appropriateness with 26 times value 4 (26 times (!) 4 x score 1, 43 times 
value 8 (34 times 4 x score 2), on asset specificity with 51 times value 9 (34 times 3 x score 3), 38 times value 12 (35 times 
(!) 3 x score 4) on non-contractibility with 62 times value 16 (59 times (!) 4 x score 4) and on relational governance with 75 
times value 16 (70 times (!) 4 x score 4). 
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power is at the heart of all B2B relationships (Cox, 2001a) it has not been included in ERA studies that 
ERAs tend to be used by buyers with supplier leverage (Emiliani, 2005; Tassabehji et al., 2006). 
 
This study’s findings can help practitioners using ERAs more effectively, because it empirically 
supports the aforementioned assumption about supplier leverage. Indeed, supporting empirical 
results found showed that buyer’s net dependence has a positive impact on perceived ERA 
appropriateness. This study, therefore, confirms that a buyer’s dependence on a supplier is a 
potential supplier power source (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007) and that the least dependent party 
dominates the exchange (Buchanan, 1992; Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). The fact that there is a 
significant impact of power and dependence in buyer-supplier relationships on procurement 
professionals’ perceived ERA appropriateness may seem fairly straightforward, but for practitioners 
it is welcome to see this line of thought empirically supported. The practical operationalisation of 
buyer dependence and supplier dependence gives procurement professionals the opportunity to 
quickly assess the buyer net dependence in a given sourcing situation. 
 
Another empirical finding that is relevant for practitioners is that, in contrast with literature 
(Ferguson et al., 2005), no support was found in the empirical results for either a positive impact on 
perceived ERA appropriateness of contractual governance, or a negative impact on perceived ERA 
appropriateness of relational governance. For practitioners this could mean that even in a situation 
that is characterised by a relational approach of the buyer-supplier relationship, the option of using 
an ERA does not have to be excluded automatically.  
 
The findings also show a, seemingly obvious, significant relation between usage history and 
perceived ERA appropriateness. Additionally, for practitioners it is valuable to know that the 
expected relation between organisation size and perceived ERA appropriateness (Mithas et al., 
2008), was not found in this study’s results. This could mean that ERAs are possibly also relevant for 
small and medium sized organisations. 
 
 
5.4 Theoretical recommendations 
 
This study was not without challenges. Its limited conclusions, due to five of the six hypotheses not 
being supported by this study’s results, have made for difficulties in defining concrete managerial 
recommendations. This study has multiple limitations that mean that the results and conclusions of 
this study should be interpreted with care and provide opportunities for further research and several 
results give rise to further research. 
 
Firstly, the used and considered appropriate leverage product group scenario-approach has its 
limitations. As stated, it is possible that the scenario-approach influenced the outcome on the 
contractual governance and relational governance variables as these depend on the purchase 
category (Pearcy & Giunipero, 2006). Possibly, inaccurate reading or easy-going hastiness have even 
strengthened this adverse effect, and perhaps led to more general opinions regarding ERAs instead 
of specifically related to the focal sourcing-scenario. Further research can be conducted into 
alternative measurement scales. One can think of a field study approach aimed at ERA cases. This 
might however give difficulties in the area of confidentiality, regarding the collection of non-
anonymous proprietary organisational ERA data.  
 
Secondly and notwithstanding the previously validated measurement scales, the subjective 
involvement of the respondents is a potential common method bias source (Hawkins et al., 2009). 
The limitation of basing oneself on procurement professionals’ self-reported perceptions do not 
represent the overall views of all stakeholders including other key decision makers (Murray, 2009) 
and obviously lead to measuring opinions (perceived ERA appropriateness) as a proxy for objective 
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facts (actual ERA appropriateness) about the relevant (Parente et al., 2004) buyer-supplier dyads. 
Further research can be conducted into alternative measurement scales. 
 
Thirdly, this study has specifically targeted procurement professionals in the Netherlands and the 
conclusions cannot be generalised beyond the Netherlands. Further research can be conducted in 
different geographical areas in order to get an international perspective on the subject and model.  
 
Fourthly, this study has specifically targeted procurement professionals in large enterprises, as far as 
the private sector is concerned. This has the effect that perceptions within small and medium 
enterprises remain underexposed, and generalisations cannot be made towards these organisations. 
Further research can be conducted including small and medium enterprises. 
 
Fifthly, since the model explained only five percent of the variance in the dependent variable PEA, it 
is obvious that the model does not represent a capacious explanation of perceived ERA 
appropriateness and that other factors have additional and substantial impact on perceived ERA 
appropriateness. Further empirical research can be conducted into the empirical relevance of 
literature-suggested factors such as the specifiability of the product and competition among 
suppliers (Hawkins et al., 2009; Wyld, 2011). 
 
Finally, finding the procurement professionals within the organisation sample frame depend on their 
presence and public visibility on the LinkedIn platform. Further studies, amongst users and non-users 
of ERAs, could also use other types of sampling, such as membership lists from national associations 
of purchase management. Since more than six-tenths of the respondents indicated to be working in 
organisations without any experience with ERAs, one could, by extension opt for composing a sample 
frame amongst active and historical users of ERAs. 
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Appendix A: Measurement scales  
 
 
 
Table 9 Measurement scales 
Variable Original statements Scale Source  
Private and public 
sector dichotomy  
(PS) 
Control variable 
 Economise on 
1 question by 
2 identical 
online surveys 
 
Perceived ERA 
appropriateness6 
(PEA) 
Dependent 
variable 
- Based on our sourcing strategy, a reverse auction 
was the best means to source our requirement 
- A reverse auction was the best means to achieve 
our sourcing goals 
- It would have been difficult to achieve our goals 
without the use of a reverse auction 
- I used a reverse auction because the projected 
savings exceeded the cost of the auction 
5-point Likert 
 
 
Hawkins et al. (2009, p. 
70) 
Organisation size 
(OS) 
Control variable 
What is the number of employees, based on full-time 
appointments (FTEs, excluding temporary personnel)? 
 Less than 100 employees 
 100 - 200 employees 
 201 - 500 employees 
 501 - 1,000 employees 
 More than 1,000 employees 
Choose one  Gelderman (2003, p. 
338) 
Current, former 
and non-users of 
ERAs 
(UH) 
Control variable 
What is your organisation’s ERA participation level in 
the last 12 months?  
 Non usage: my organisation has not held ERAs 
 Trial usage: my organisation has scarcely held ERAs 
 Low usage: my organisation has held a few ERAs 
 High usage: my organisation has held many ERAs 
 Past usage: my organisation has no longer held 
ERAs 
Choose one Saprikis (2012, p. 141) 
Asset specificity7 8 
(AS) 
Independent 
variable 
- Supplier will invest in manufacturing equipment 
specifically for your requirements 
- Supplier has technical labour skills that are unique 
to your requirement 
- Supplier understands your business processes in 
order to satisfy all your needs 
5-point Likert Mithas et al. (2008, p. 
723), using construct on 
combined scales of 
Dyer (1997, p. 540); 
Walker and Poppo 
(1991, p. 73); Zaheer 
and Venkatraman 
(1994, p. 556) 
 
  
                                                 
6 The conceptual definition of Perceived ERA appropriateness is “the degree to which a sourcing professional views the use 
of an eRA as a fit between the attributes of the tool, the specific requirement being sourced, and the supply market” 
(Hawkins et al., 2009). 
7 The conceptual definition of Asset specificity is “the degree to which investment in a particular asset has lower value in its 
next-best use” (Williamson, 1979). 
8 The included operationalised Asset specificity items are the combined validated supplier related Asset specificity items 
with sufficient factor loadings from Mithas et al. (2008, pp. 723-724). 
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Variable Original statements Scale Source  
Non-
contractibility9 10 
(NC) 
Independent 
variable 
- Supplier that keeps abreast with latest 
technological developments 
- Supplier that develops new technology products 
critical to your success 
- Supplier that allows your participation in their 
planning and goal-setting activities 
- Supplier that shares detailed information on their 
cost structure 
- Supplier that proactively anticipates your emerging 
needs 
- Supplier that is responsive to your requests 
- Supplier that keeps you updated on your requests 
- Supplier that is absolutely trustworthy 
- Supplier that honours their promises 
- Supplier that establishes a very high level of mutual 
confidence with your firm 
- Supplier that will be flexible in response to requests 
that may be beyond the terms of your contract 
- Supplier will modify the agreement rather than 
stick to original terms if an unexpected situation 
arises 
- Supplier will make continuous adjustments to cope 
with changing circumstances 
5-point Likert Mithas et al. (2008, pp. 
723-724), using 
construct on combined 
scales of Cusumano and 
Takeishi (1991, p. 572); 
Dyer (1997, pp. 
540,555); Goodhue and 
Thompson (1995, p. 
235); Helper (1991, p. 
26); Johnston and 
Lawrence (1988); 
Monczka, Petersen, 
Handfield, and Ragatz 
(1998, pp. 574-575); 
Takeishi (2001, p. 428); 
Young-Ybarra and 
Wiersema (1999, p. 
449); Zaheer and 
Venkatraman (1994, p. 
563) 
Contractual 
governance11 
(CG) 
Independent 
variable 
 
 
- We should seek detailed contracts before 
conducting any further business with our supplier 
- Responsibilities of both parties should be clearly 
specified in the contract and both parties should 
adhere strictly to these terms 
- We should seek penalties for inadequate 
performance in the contractual relationship with 
our supplier  
- We should seek maximum protection through the 
contractual relations with our supplier partner 
5-point Likert 
 
 
Andaleeb (1995, p. 170) 
 
 
  
                                                 
9 The conceptual definition of Non-contractibility is “difficult-to-specify future investments that a firm may need to make to 
sustain a set of existing transactions or to initiate a new set of exchanges with the same partner” (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 
1993a). 
10 The included operationalised Non-contractibility items are the combined validated supplier related Non-contractibility 
items with sufficient composite reliability and sufficient factor loadings from Mithas et al. (2008, pp. 709, 723-724). 
11 The conceptual definition of Contractual governance is “the degree to which the formal contract is implemented in the 
exchange” (Ferguson et al., 2005). 
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Variable Original statements Scale Source  
Relational 
governance12 
(RG) 
Independent 
variable 
 
 
- In the relationship, it is expected that any 
information that might help the other party will be 
provided to them 
- Exchange of information in the relationship takes 
place frequently and informally and not only 
according to a pre-specified agreement 
- It is expected that the parties provide proprietary 
information if it can help the other party 
- It is expected that we keep each other informed 
about events or changes that may affect the other 
party 
- Flexibility in response to requests for changes is 
characteristic of this relationship 
- The parties expect to be able to make adjustments 
in the ongoing relationship to cope with changing 
circumstances 
- Problems that arise in the course of the relationship 
are treated by the parties as joint rather than 
individual responsibilities 
- The parties in this relationship do not mind owing 
each other favours 
- The parties are committed to improvements that 
may benefit the relationship as a whole and not 
only the individual parties 
5-point Likert Heide and John (1992, 
p. 37) 
Buyer’s net 
dependence13 
(BND) 
Independent 
variable 
=BD - SD  Caniëls and Gelderman 
(2010, p. 252) 
Total 
interdependence
14 
(TI) 
Independent 
variable 
=BD+SD  Caniëls and Gelderman 
(2010, p. 252) 
Buyer 
dependence 
(BD) 
- Our supplier would be costly to lose 
- Our supplier would be difficult to replace 
- We need the supplier’s expertise 
- We are dependent on our supplier 
5-point Likert 
 
Caniëls and Gelderman 
(2010, p. 252) 
Supplier 
dependence 
(SD) 
- Our supplier would find it costly to lose us 
- Our supplier would find it difficult to replace us 
- Our supplier needs our expertise 
- Our supplier is dependent on us 
5-point Likert 
 
Caniëls and Gelderman 
(2010, p. 252) 
 
  
                                                 
12 The conceptual definition of Relational governance is “the strength of the social norms present in the exchange” 
(Ferguson et al., 2005). 
13 The conceptual definition of Buyer’s net dependence is “the difference between the buyer dependence and the supplier 
dependence” (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). 
14 The conceptual definition of Total interdependence is “the sum of the buyer dependence and the supplier dependence” 
(Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire content 
 
 
 
Please find the questionnaire contents underneath. All questions are based on the operationalisations in Appendix A, where 
you can also find the sources of these measurement scales. Per instruction or question you will first find the English 
translation, in grey font, and then the instruction or question in Dutch, in black font. The survey itself was held in Dutch, 
and only the information in black fonts was presented to the respondents in the online questionnaire. 
 
Thanks for your participation in this survey on electronic auctions. This requires NO experience with electronic auctions. 
Two iPads will be raffled among the participants. 
 
Most of the questions are formulated as statements. You only indicate the extent to which you agree with the statements 
on a 5-point scale (strongly disagree - disagree - neutral - agree - strongly agree). 
 
Important: When answering the questions, please take a specific sourcing process in mind that you were involved in 
yourself, and that was completed recently (for example, in the past year). It must involve the purchase of a LEVERAGE 
PRODUCT (high procurement value, low purchasing risk, well-specifiable, non-strategic). 
 
We ask for your opinion about the suitability of an electronic auction. Thus, it is not necessary that it is a sourcing process in 
which an electronic auction was used! 
 
Please answer the questions with the (eventually) CHOSEN SUPPLIER in mind. 
 
Bedankt voor uw deelname aan deze enquête over elektronische veilingen. Hiervoor is GEEN ervaring met elektronische 
veilingen vereist. Er worden 2 iPad’s onder de deelnemers verloot. 
 
De meeste vragen zijn geformuleerd als stellingen. U geeft alleen aan in hoeverre u het met de stellingen eens bent op een 
5-puntsschaal (volledig oneens - oneens - neutraal - eens - volledig eens). 
 
Belangrijk: gelieve bij het beantwoorden van de vragen een specifiek inkoopproces in gedachten nemen, waarbij u zelf 
betrokken was en dat nog niet zo lang geleden is afgerond (bijvoorbeeld in het afgelopen jaar). Het moet gaan om de 
inkoop van een HEFBOOMPRODUCT (hoge inkoopwaarde, laag inkooprisico, goed specificeerbaar, niet strategisch). 
 
We vragen naar uw mening over de geschiktheid van een elektronische veiling. Het is dus niet noodzakelijk dat het gaat om 
een inkoopproces waarbij gebruik is gemaakt van een elektronische veiling! 
 
Graag de vragen beantwoorden met de (uiteindelijk) GEKOZEN LEVERANCIER in gedachten. 
 
 
1/9 Organisation size Organisatiegrootte 
OS 
What is the number of employees, based on full-time appointments (FTEs, excluding temporary personnel)? 
 Less than 100 employees 
 100 - 200 employees 
 201 - 500 employees 
 501 - 1,000 employees 
 More than 1,000 employees 
Wat is het aantal medewerkers, op basis van fulltime-aanstellingen (fte’s, excl. uitzendkrachten)? 
 Minder dan 100 medewerkers 
 100 - 200 medewerkers 
 201 - 500 medewerkers 
 501 - 1.000 medewerkers 
 Meer dan 1.000 medewerkers 
 
 
2/9 Usage history Gebruiksgeschiedenis 
UH 
What is your organisation’s electronic reverse auction participation level in the last 12 months?  
 Non usage: my organisation has not held electronic reverse auctions 
 Trial usage: my organisation has scarcely held electronic reverse auctions 
 Low usage: my organisation has held a few electronic reverse auctions 
 High usage: my organisation has held many electronic reverse auctions 
 Past usage: my organisation has no longer held electronic reverse auctions 
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Wat is de deelname van uw organisatie aan elektronische inkoopveilingen in de afgelopen 12 maanden?  
 Geen gebruik: mijn organisatie heeft geen elektronische inkoopveilingen gehouden 
 Proefgebruik: mijn organisatie heeft nauwelijks elektronische inkoopveilingen gehouden 
 Laag gebruik: mijn organisatie heeft enkele elektronische inkoopveilingen gehouden 
 Hoog gebruik: mijn organisatie heeft vele elektronische inkoopveilingen gehouden 
 Voormalig gebruik: mijn organisatie heeft niet langer elektronische inkoopveilingen gehouden 
 
 
3/9 Perceived ERA appropriateness Geschiktheid elektronische inkoopveilingen 
PEA1 
Based on our sourcing strategy, an electronic reverse auction would have been the best means to source. 
Op basis van onze inkoopstrategie zou een elektronische inkoopveiling de beste inkoopmethode zijn geweest. 
PEA2 
An electronic reverse auction would have been the best means to achieve our sourcing goals. 
Een elektronische inkoopveiling zou de beste manier zijn geweest om onze inkoopdoelen te bereiken. 
PEA3 
It was difficult to achieve our goals without the use of an electronic reverse auction. 
Het was moeilijk om zonder een elektronische inkoopveiling onze doelen te bereiken. 
PEA4 
We contemplated an electronic reverse auction because the projected savings exceeded the auction costs. 
We overwogen een elektronische inkoopveiling, omdat de besparingen hoger leken dan de veilingkosten. 
 
 
4/9 Asset specificity Specifieke vaardigheden en investeringen 
AS1 
The supplier invests in equipment specifically for your requirements. 
De leverancier investeert in apparatuur, specifiek om aan uw eisen tegemoet te komen.  
AS2 
The supplier has technical labour skills that are unique to your requirement.  
De leverancier heeft technische vaardigheden die uniek zijn voor uw eisen.  
AS3 
The supplier understands your business processes in order to satisfy all your needs.  
De leverancier begrijpt uw bedrijfsprocessen zodat deze aan al uw wensen kan voldoen.  
 
 
5/9 Buyer dependence Afhankelijkheid inkoper 
BD1 
Our supplier would be costly to lose.  
De leverancier verliezen zou voor ons kostbaar zijn. 
BD2 
Our supplier would be difficult to replace.  
De leverancier zou moeilijk te vervangen zijn. 
BD3 
We need the supplier’s expertise.  
We hebben de deskundigheid van de leverancier nodig. 
BD4 
We are dependent on our supplier.  
We zijn afhankelijk van de leverancier.  
 
 
6/9 Supplier dependence Afhankelijkheid leverancier 
SD1 
Our supplier would find it costly to lose us. 
De leverancier zou het kostbaar vinden om ons te verliezen.  
SD2 
Our supplier would find it difficult to replace us.  
De leverancier zou het moeilijk vinden om ons te vervangen.  
SD3 
Our supplier needs our expertise.  
De leverancier heeft onze deskundigheid nodig.  
SD4 
Our supplier is dependent on us.  
De leverancier is afhankelijk van ons.  
 
 
7/9 Contractual governance Contractueel toezicht 
CG1 
We should seek detailed contracts before conducting any further business with our supplier.  
We moeten gedetailleerde contracten hebben voordat we verder zaken doen met onze leverancier.  
CG2 
Responsibilities of both parties should be clearly specified in the contract and both parties should adhere 
strictly to these terms.  
Verantwoordelijkheden van beide partijen moeten duidelijk in het contract zijn vermeld en beide partijen 
moeten zich strikt aan deze voorwaarden houden.  
CG3 
We should seek penalties for inadequate performance in the contractual relationship with our supplier.  
We moeten in de contractuele relatie met onze leverancier ondermaats presteren bestraffen.  
CG4 
We should seek maximum protection through the contractual relations with our supplier partner.  
We moeten via de contractuele relatie met onze leverancier maximale bescherming zoeken. 
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8/9 Relational governance Relationeel toezicht 
RG1 
In the relationship, it is expected that any information that might help the other party is provided to them.  
In de relatie is de verwachting dat alle informatie die de andere partij kan helpen aan hen wordt verstrekt.  
RG2 
Exchange of information in the relationship takes place frequently and informally and not only according to a 
pre-specified agreement.  
Informatie-uitwisseling in de relatie gebeurt regelmatig en informeel en niet alleen volgens een vooraf 
gespecificeerde overeenkomst.  
RG3 
It is expected that the parties provide proprietary information if it can help the other party.  
De verwachting is dat de partijen bedrijfseigen informatie overdragen als dat de andere partij kan helpen.  
RG4 
It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party.  
De verwachting is dat de partijen elkaar op de hoogte houden over gebeurtenissen of veranderingen die de 
andere partij kunnen beïnvloeden. 
RG5 
Flexibility in response to requests for changes is characteristic of this relationship.  
Flexibiliteit als antwoord op wijzigingsverzoeken is kenmerkend voor de relatie.  
RG6 
The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with changing 
circumstances.  
De partijen verwachten aanpassingen te kunnen maken in de duurzame relatie om met veranderende 
omstandigheden om te gaan.  
RG7 
The parties as joint rather than individual responsibilities treat problems that arise in the course of the 
relationship. 
Problemen die zich in de loop van de relatie voordoen worden door de partijen behandeld als gezamenlijke in 
plaats van als individuele verantwoordelijkheden.  
RG8 
The parties in this relationship do not mind owing each other favours.  
De partijen in deze relatie vinden het niet erg elkaar gunsten verschuldigd te zijn.  
RG9 
The parties are committed to improvements that may benefit the relationship as a whole and not only the 
individual parties.  
De partijen zetten zich in voor verbeteringen die de relatie als geheel ten goede komen en niet alleen de 
partijen afzonderlijk.  
 
 
9/9 Non-contractibility Niet-contracteerbaarheid 
NC1 
The supplier keeps abreast with latest technological developments.  
De leverancier blijft op de hoogte van de nieuwste technologische ontwikkelingen. 
NC2 
The supplier develops new technology products critical to your success.  
De leverancier ontwikkelt nieuw technologische producten die cruciaal voor uw succes zijn. 
NC3 
The supplier allows your participation in their planning and goal-setting activities.  
De leverancier maakt uw deelname aan hun planning en doelstelling mogelijk. 
NC4 
The supplier shares detailed information on their cost structure.  
De leverancier deelt gedetailleerde informatie over zijn kostenstructuur.  
NC5 
The supplier proactively anticipates to your emerging needs.  
De leverancier anticipeert proactief op uw nieuwe behoeften.  
NC6 
The supplier is responsive to your requests.  
De leverancier speelt in op uw verzoeken.  
NC7 
The supplier keeps you updated on your requests.  
De leverancier houdt u op de hoogte van uw verzoeken.  
NC8 
The supplier is absolutely trustworthy.  
De leverancier is volledig betrouwbaar.  
NC9 
The supplier honours their promises.  
De leverancier komt zijn beloften na.  
NC10 
The supplier establishes a very high level of mutual confidence with your firm.  
De leverancier realiseert een zeer hoge mate van wederzijds vertrouwen met uw bedrijf.  
NC11 
The supplier is flexible in response to requests that may be beyond the terms of your contract.  
De leverancier is flexibel in antwoord op uw verzoeken die buiten de voorwaarden van het contract vallen.  
NC12 
The supplier modifies the agreement rather than stick to original terms if an unexpected situation arises.  
De leverancier wijzigt de overeenkomst als zich een onverwachte situatie voordoet in plaats van vast te 
houden aan de oorspronkelijke voorwaarden.  
NC13 
The supplier makes continuous adjustments to cope with changing circumstances.  
De leverancier maakt voortdurend aanpassingen om met veranderende omstandigheden om te gaan.  
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We kindly thank you for participating. 
Do not forget to push the “SUBMIT” button! 
You will then see how you can have a chance in the iPad raffle. 
 (This is separated from your response because of anonymity). 
 
ing. Bart Willem Nagel 
dr. Kees Gelderman  
 
Wij danken u hartelijk voor uw medewerking. 
Vergeet niet op de knop "INDIENEN" te drukken. 
U ziet dan ook hoe u kans maakt in de iPad-verloting. 
(Dit is gescheiden van uw response vanwege anonimiteit). 
 
ing. Bart Willem Nagel 
dr. Kees Gelderman 
 
 
 
Please send an e-mail for a summary of this research and a chance in the iPad15 raffle to:  
bw.nagel@studie.ou.nl  
 
Stuurt u een e-mail voor een samenvatting van dit onderzoek en een kans in de iPad16-verloting naar: 
bw.nagel@studie.ou.nl 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
15 2 iPads (type mini Wi-Fi 16GB) will be raffled among the respondents. 
16 2 iPad’s (type mini Wi-Fi 16GB) worden onder de respondenten verloot. 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire invitation and reminder 
 
 
 
Questionnaire invitation 
 
 
 
Please find the questionnaire invitation underneath. You will find the English invitation translation in grey font, and then 
the invitation in Dutch in black font. The invitation itself was sent in Dutch: 
 
 
 
Subject: Open University - Research among procurement professionals on electronic reverse auctions - experience with 
auctions NOT required. 
 
Dear “Mr.” “Jansen”, dear “Piet”,17 
 
Bart Willem Nagel and Kees Gelderman of the Open University of the Netherlands (www.ou.nl) conduct scientific research 
among procurement professionals on electronic reverse auctions use, in order to obtain more insight in determining 
factors. 
 
Your help is important. Would you like to participate? Then fill in the questionnaire on 
http://nl.surveymonkey.com/s/OUPublic. Filling out the questionnaire takes about 10 minutes. Your answers remain 
anonymous and confidential. 
 
Two iPads will be raffled among the participants, and you can receive a research summary. 
 
For questions and suggestions, please contact bw.nagel@studie.ou.nl. 
Thank you and kind regards, 
 
ing. Bart Willem Nagel 
dr. Kees Gelderman  
 
 
 
Onderwerp: Open Universiteit - Onderzoek onder inkoopprofessionals naar elektronische inkoopveilingen - ervaring met 
veilingen NIET vereist. 
 
Geachte “heer” “Jansen”, beste “Piet”, 
 
Bart Willem Nagel en Kees Gelderman van de Open Universiteit Nederland (www.ou.nl) doen wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
onder inkoopprofessionals naar het gebruik van elektronische inkoopveilingen, om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in factoren die 
hierbij een rol spelen. 
 
Uw hulp is belangrijk. Wilt u deelnemen? Vul dan de enquête in via http://nl.surveymonkey.com/s/OUPublic. De enquête 
invullen duurt ongeveer 10 minuten. Uw antwoorden blijven anoniem en vertrouwelijk. 
 
Onder de deelnemers worden 2 iPad’s verloot en u kunt een onderzoeksamenvatting ontvangen. 
 
Voor vragen en suggesties kunt u contact opnemen met bw.nagel@studie.ou.nl. 
Bij voorbaat hartelijk dank voor uw moeite. 
Met vriendelijke groet, 
 
ing. Bart Willem Nagel 
dr. Kees Gelderman  
  
                                                 
17 Please note that, in this appendix, words between quotation marks are variable fields that are specified per invitee. 
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Questionnaire reminder 
 
 
 
Please find the questionnaire reminder underneath. You will find the English reminder translation in grey font, and then the 
reminder in Dutch in black font. The reminder itself was sent in Dutch: 
 
 
 
Subject: Open University - Research among procurement professionals on electronic reverse auctions - experience with 
auctions NOT required. 
 
Dear “Mr.” “Jansen”, dear “Piet”, 
 
Recently you received my invitation, asking you to participate in a study of the Open University of the Netherlands. 
Scientific research is highly dependent on feedback from practice. For that reason, I respectfully ask again to participate in 
this study. For that reason we respectfully ask you again to participate in this study. 
 
Bart Willem Nagel and Kees Gelderman of the Open University of the Netherlands (www.ou.nl) conduct scientific research 
among procurement professionals on electronic reverse auctions use, in order to obtain more insight in determining 
factors. 
 
Your help is important. Would you like to participate? Then fill in the questionnaire on 
http://nl.surveymonkey.com/s/OUPublic. Filling out the questionnaire takes about 10 minutes. Your answers remain 
anonymous and confidential. 
 
Two iPads will be raffled among the participants, and you can receive a research summary. 
 
For questions and suggestions, please contact bw.nagel@studie.ou.nl. 
Thank you and kind regards, 
 
ing. Bart Willem Nagel 
dr. Kees Gelderman  
 
 
 
Onderwerp: Open Universiteit - Onderzoek onder inkoopprofessionals naar elektronische inkoopveilingen - ervaring met 
veilingen NIET vereist. 
 
Geachte “heer” “Jansen”, beste “Piet”, 
 
Onlangs hebt u mijn uitnodiging ontvangen, waarin u wordt gevraagd deel te nemen aan een onderzoek van Open 
Universiteit Nederland. Wetenschappelijk onderzoek is afhankelijk van feedback uit de praktijk. Om die reden vragen wij u 
opnieuw respectvol om deel te nemen aan dit onderzoek. 
 
Bart Willem Nagel en Kees Gelderman van de Open Universiteit Nederland (www.ou.nl) doen wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
onder inkoopprofessionals naar het gebruik van elektronische inkoopveilingen, om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in factoren die 
hierbij een rol spelen. 
 
Uw hulp is belangrijk. Wilt u deelnemen? Vul dan de enquête in via http://nl.surveymonkey.com/s/OUPublic. De enquête 
invullen duurt ongeveer 10 minuten. Uw antwoorden blijven anoniem en vertrouwelijk. 
 
Onder de deelnemers worden 2 iPad’s verloot en u kunt een onderzoeksamenvatting ontvangen. 
 
Voor vragen en suggesties kunt u contact opnemen met bw.nagel@studie.ou.nl. 
Bij voorbaat hartelijk dank voor uw moeite. 
Met vriendelijke groet, 
 
ing. Bart Willem Nagel 
dr. Kees Gelderman  
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Appendix D: Descriptive statistics empirical results 
 
 
 
Table 10 Absolute and relative frequencies of answer options of model variables 
Variable 
 [Item] 
strongly 
disagree 
disagree 
 
neutral 
 
agree 
 
strongly 
agree 
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
 PEA1  
 PEA2  
 PEA3  
 PEA4  
Asset specificity 
 AS1  
 AS2  
 AS3  
Buyer dependence 
 BD1 
 BD2  
 BD3  
 BD4  
Supplier dependence 
 SD1 
 SD2  
 SD3 
 SD4  
Contractual governance 
 CG1  
 CG2  
 CG3  
 CG4  
Relational governance 
 RG1  
 RG2  
 RG3  
 RG4  
 RG5  
 RG6  
 RG7  
 RG8  
 RG9  
Non-contractibility 
 NC1  
 NC2  
 NC3  
 NC4  
 NC5  
 NC6  
 NC7  
 NC8  
 NC9  
 NC10  
 NC11  
 NC12  
 NC13  
 
Total 
 
38 (15,6%) 
37 (15,2%) 
81 (33,3%) 
63 (25,9%) 
 
19 (7,8%) 
16 (6,6%) 
3 (1,2%) 
 
14 (5,8%) 
18 (7,4%) 
9 (3,7%) 
30 (12,3%) 
 
4 (1,6%) 
6 (2,5%) 
15 (6,2%) 
17 (7,0%) 
 
2 (0,8%) 
0 (0,0%) 
1 (0,4%) 
1 (0,4%) 
 
1 (0,4%) 
2 (0,8%) 
2 (0,8%) 
1 (0,4%) 
2 (0,8%) 
1 (0,4%) 
1 (0,4%) 
3 (1,2%) 
2 (0,8%) 
 
0 (0,0%) 
4 (1,6%) 
4 (1,6%) 
13 (5,3%) 
2 (0,8%) 
0 (0,0%) 
0 (0,0%) 
0 (0,0%) 
0 (0,0%) 
0 (0,0%) 
3 (1,2%) 
11 (4,5%) 
7 (2,9%) 
 
433 (4,3%) 
 
103 (42,4%) 
108 (44,4%) 
112 (46,1%) 
85 (35,0%) 
 
70 (28,8%) 
63 (25,9%) 
28 (11,5%) 
 
96 (39,5%) 
129 (53,1%) 
53 (21,8%) 
118 (48,6%) 
 
16 (6,6%) 
35 (14,4%) 
83 (34,2%) 
88 (36,2%) 
 
65 (26,7%) 
14 (5,8%) 
33 (13,6%) 
38 (15,6%) 
 
10 (4,1%) 
32 (13,2%) 
32 (13,2%) 
11 (4,5%) 
14 (5,8%) 
10 (4,1%) 
24 (9,9%) 
45 (18,5%) 
18 (7,4%) 
 
1 (0,4%) 
35 (14,4%) 
31 (12,8%) 
75 (30,9%) 
27 (11,1%) 
7 (2,9%) 
8 (3,3%) 
17 (7,0%) 
7 (2,9%) 
15 (6,2%) 
16 (6,6%) 
53 (21,8%) 
59 (24,3%) 
 
1884 (18,9%) 
 
53 (21,8%) 
54 (22,2%) 
34 (14,0%) 
58 (23,9%) 
 
76 (31,3%) 
72 (29,6%) 
79 (32,5%) 
 
59 (24,3%) 
64 (26,3%) 
55 (22,6%) 
74 (30,5%) 
 
40 (16,5%) 
106 (43,6%) 
81 (33,3%) 
97 (39,9%) 
 
38 (15,6%) 
39 (16,0%) 
85 (35,0%) 
92 (37,9%) 
 
43 (17,7%) 
31 (12,8%) 
73 (30,0%) 
31 (12,8%) 
44 (18,1%) 
40 (16,5%) 
58 (23,9%) 
111 (45,7%) 
45 (18,5%) 
 
39 (16,0%) 
88 (36,2%) 
95 (39,1%) 
57 (23,5%) 
68 (28,0%) 
25 (10,3%) 
43 (17,7%) 
94 (38,7%) 
76 (31,3%) 
85 (35,0%) 
67 (27,6%) 
84 (34,6%) 
86 (35,4%) 
 
2639 (26,5%) 
 
43 (17,7%) 
40 (16,5%) 
14 (5,8%) 
28 (11,5%) 
 
69 (28,4%) 
79 (32,5%) 
115 (47,3%) 
 
67 (27,6%) 
28 (11,5%) 
111 (45,7%) 
20 (8,2%) 
 
163 (67,1%) 
82 (33,7%) 
64 (26,3%) 
39 (16,0%) 
 
110 (45,3%) 
153 (63,0%) 
115 (47,3%) 
102 (42,0%) 
 
159 (65,4%) 
156 (64,2%) 
122 (50,2%) 
163 (67,1%) 
154 (63,4%) 
168 (69,1%) 
138 (56,8%) 
80 (32,9%) 
154 (63,4%) 
 
163 (67,1%) 
95 (39,1%) 
104 (42,8%) 
87 (35,8%) 
134 (55,1%) 
195 (80,2%) 
177 (72,8%) 
105 (43,2%) 
130 (53,5%) 
128 (52,7%) 
146 (60,1%) 
90 (37,0%) 
85 (35,0%) 
 
4375 (43,9%) 
 
6 (2,5%) 
4 (1,6%) 
2 (0,8%) 
9 (3,7%) 
 
9 (3,7%) 
13 (5,3%) 
18 (7,4%) 
 
7 (2,9%) 
4 (1,6%) 
15 (6,2%) 
1 (0,4%) 
 
20 (8,2%) 
14 (5,8%) 
0 (0,0%) 
2 (0,8%) 
 
28 (11,5%) 
37 (15,2%) 
9 (3,7%) 
10 (4,1%) 
 
30 (12,3%) 
22 (9,1%) 
14 (5,8%) 
37 (15,2%) 
29 (11,9%) 
24 (9,9%) 
22 (9,1%) 
4 (1,6%) 
24 (9,9%) 
 
40 (16,5%) 
21 (8,6%) 
9 (3,7%) 
11 (4,5%) 
12 (4,9%) 
16 (6,6%) 
15 (6,2%) 
27 (11,1%) 
30 (12,3%) 
15 (6,2%) 
11 (4,5%) 
5 (2,1%) 
6 (2,5%) 
 
632 (6,3%) 
N=243, please not that all sources of the used measurement scales can be found in appendix A.  
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Appendix E: Factor analysis (initial) 
 
 
 
Table 11 Factor loading results of the initial factor analysis 
Variable 
Item 
Factor loadings 
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
PEA1  
PEA2  
PEA3 
PEA4  
Asset specificity 
AS1  
AS2  
AS3  
Non-contractibility 
NC1* 
NC2 
NC3   
NC4* 
NC5  
NC6  
NC7  
NC8  
NC9  
NC10  
NC11 
NC12  
NC13  
Contractual governance 
CG1 
CG2  
CG3* 
CG4  
Relational governance 
RG1  
RG2  
RG3* 
RG4  
RG5* 
RG6  
RG7  
RG8* 
RG9  
Buyer dependence 
BD1  
BD2  
BD3  
BD4  
Supplier dependence 
SD1  
SD2  
SD3* 
SD4* 
 
 .771  
 .820  
 .553  
 .565  
 
 .662  
 .716  
 .523  
 
.428 
 .734  
 .567  
.497 
 .570  
 .714  
 .625  
 .751  
 .782  
 .681  
 .534  
 .784  
 .759  
 
 .580  
 .641  
 .319  
 .626  
 
 .614  
 .526  
 .473  
 .565  
 .374  
 .546  
 .664  
 .341  
 .598  
 
 .585  
 .711  
 .514  
 .656  
 
 .500  
 .705  
 .426  
 .484 
N=243, extraction method: principal component analysis with Varimax rotation, please not that all sources of the used 
measurement scales can be found in appendix A, * Items NC1, NC4, CG3, RG3, RG5, RG8, SD3 and SD4 are discarded 
because of a factor loading less than .500. 
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Appendix F: Factor analysis (sequential) 
 
 
 
Table 12 Factor loading results of the second factor analysis 
Variable 
Item 
Factor loadings 
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
PEA1  
PEA2  
PEA3 
PEA4  
Asset specificity 
AS1  
AS2  
AS3  
Non-contractibility 
NC2* 
NC3* 
NC5  
NC6* 
NC7* 
NC8  
NC9  
NC10  
NC11* 
Contractual governance 
CG1 
CG2  
CG4  
Relational governance 
RG1*  
RG4  
RG6  
RG7  
RG9  
Buyer dependence 
BD1  
BD2  
BD3  
BD4  
Supplier dependence 
SD1  
SD2 
 
 .771  
 .820  
 .553  
 .565  
 
 .662  
 .716  
 .523  
 
 .262  
 .371  
 .543  
 .413  
 .452  
 .596  
 .583  
 .579  
 .384  
  
 .664  
 .684  
 .618  
 
 .285  
.502  
 .519  
 .541  
 .642  
 
 .585  
 .711  
 .514  
 .656  
 
 .794  
 .794 
N=243, extraction method: principal component analysis with Varimax rotation, please not that all sources of the used 
measurement scales can be found in appendix A, * Items NC2, NC3, NC6, NC7, NC11, and RG1 are also discarded because of 
a factor loading less than .500. 
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Appendix G: Reliability analysis (initial) 
 
 
 
Table 13 Reliability statistics 
Variable18  Cronbach's α Cronbach's α based on 
standardised items 
Number of Items 
PEA .837 .838 4 
AS .711 .709 3 
NC .821 .835 11 
CG .724 .737 3 
RG .718 .726 6 
BD .784 .791 4 
SD .738 .741 2 
N=243 
 
Table 14 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Perceived ERA appropriateness 
Item  PEA1 PEA2 PEA3 PEA4 
PEA1 
PEA2 
PEA3 
PEA4 
1 
.816 
.505 
.515 
 
1 
.552 
.560 
 
 
1 
.438 
 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 15 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Asset specificity 
Item  AS1 AS2 AS3 
AS1 
AS2 
AS3 
1 
.560 
.359 
 
1 
.425 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 16 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Non-contractibility 
Item  NC2 NC3 NC5 NC6 NC7 NC8 NC9 NC10 NC11 NC12 NC13 
NC2 
NC3 
NC5 
NC6 
NC7 
NC8 
NC9 
NC10 
NC11  
NC12 19 
NC13 20 
1 
.416 
.327 
.184 
.222 
.332 
.291 
.367 
.173 
.037 
.205 
 
1 
.366 
.368 
.395 
.311 
.309 
.373 
.314 
.075 
.159 
 
 
1 
.528 
.468 
.489 
.488 
.458 
.326 
.089 
.125 
 
 
 
1 
.484 
.337 
.351 
.331 
.373 
.089 
.125 
 
 
 
 
1 
.416 
.355 
.394 
.381 
.074 
.098 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.711 
.593 
.395 
.106 
.231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.608 
.418 
.033 
.164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.435 
.156 
.243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.263 
.306 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.540 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 17 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Contractual governance 
Item  CG1 CG2 CG4 
CG1 
CG2 
CG4 
1 
.524 
.451 
 
1 
.474 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
  
                                                 
18 Items NC1, NC4, CG3, RG3, RG5, RG8, SD3 and SD4 were discarded because of a factor loading less than .500. 
19 The low values for NC12 in this matrix have caused this item to be discarded. 
20 The low values for NC13 in this matrix have caused this item to be discarded. 
  63 
Table 18 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Relational governance 
Item  RG1 RG2 RG4 RG6 RG7 RG9 
RG1 
RG2 21 
RG4 
RG6 
RG7 
RG9 
1 
.375 
.391 
.208 
.173 
.300 
 
1 
.235 
.164 
.078 
.092 
 
 
1 
.398 
.326 
.399 
 
 
 
1 
.429 
.453 
 
 
 
 
1 
.577 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 19 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Buyer dependence 
Item  BD1 BD2 BD3 BD4 
BD1 
BD2 
BD3 
BD4 
1 
.619 
.365 
.419 
 
1 
.409 
.581 
 
 
1 
.528 
 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 20 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Supplier dependence 
Item  SD1 SD2 
SD1 
SD2 
1 
.588 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 21 Reliability analysis item statistics 
Variable 
Item 
Mean Standard deviation 
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
PEA1  
PEA2  
PEA3  
PEA4  
Asset specificity 
AS1  
AS2  
AS3  
Non-contractibility 
NC2  
NC3  
NC5  
NC6  
NC7  
NC8  
NC9  
NC10  
NC11  
NC12 
NC13 
 Contractual governance 
CG1  
CG2  
CG4  
Relational governance 
RG1  
RG2  
RG4  
RG6  
RG7  
RG9  
 
2.49 
2.45 
1.95 
2.32 
 
2.91 
3.04 
3.48 
 
3.39 
3.34 
3.52 
3.91 
3.82 
3.58 
3.75 
3.59 
3.60 
3.10 
3.10 
 
3.40 
3.88 
3.34 
 
3.85 
3.67 
3.92 
3.84 
3.64 
3.74 
 
1.034 
0.992 
0.882 
1.093 
 
1.015 
1.032 
0.840 
 
0.895 
0.810 
0.789 
0.525 
0.582 
0.779 
0.702 
0.701 
0.734 
0.919 
0.894 
 
1.029 
0.728 
0.804 
 
0.694 
0.846 
0.703 
0.664 
0.797 
0.768 
                                                 
21 The low values for RG2 in this matrix have caused this item to be discarded. 
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Buyer dependence 
BD1  
BD2  
BD3  
BD4  
Supplier dependence 
SD1  
SD2  
 
2.82 
2.47 
3.29 
2.36 
 
3.74 
3.26 
 
0.995 
0.854 
0.996 
0.818 
 
0.769 
0.864 
N=243 
 
Table 22 Reliability analysis item-total statistics  
Variable 
Item 
Scale mean if 
item deleted 
Scale variance if 
item deleted 
Corrected 
item-total 
correlation 
Squared 
multiple 
correlation 
Cronbach's 
α if item 
deleted 
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
PEA1 
PEA2 
PEA3 
PEA4  
Asset specificity 
AS1  
AS2  
AS3  
Non-contractibility 
NC2  
NC3  
NC5 
NC6  
NC7  
NC8  
NC9  
NC10  
NC11  
NC12 
NC13 
Contractual governance 
CG1  
CG2  
CG4  
Relational governance 
RG1  
RG2 
RG4  
RG6  
RG7  
RG9  
Buyer dependence 
BD1  
BD2  
BD3  
BD4  
Supplier dependence 
SD1  
SD2  
 
6.72 
6.76 
7.26 
6.88 
 
6.52 
6.40 
5.95 
 
35.32 
35.36 
35.18 
34.80 
34.88 
35.12 
34.95 
35.12 
35.10 
35.60 
35.60 
 
7.21 
6.74 
7.28 
 
18.82 
19.00 
18.75 
18.83 
19.03 
18.93 
 
8.12 
8.47 
7.65 
8.58 
 
3.26 
3.74 
 
5.981 
5.970 
7.300 
6.392 
 
2.507 
2.347 
3.267 
 
21.358 
21.240 
20.612 
22.765 
22.367 
20.461 
21.179 
20.887 
21.316 
22.555 
21.513 
 
1.731 
2.451 
2.374 
 
6.356 
6.517 
6.040 
6.257 
5.904 
5.735 
 
4.755 
4.911 
4.931 
5.178 
 
0.747 
0.592 
 
.743 
.795 
.573 
.583 
 
.555 
.604 
.445 
 
.408 
.487 
.600 
.497 
.513 
.633 
.598 
.648 
.543 
.244 
.388 
 
.565 
.588 
.525 
 
.436 
.261 
.529 
.501 
.470 
.554 
 
.566 
.676 
.515 
.632 
 
.588 
.588 
 
.674 
.709 
.334 
.345 
 
.331 
.371 
.202 
 
.266 
.319 
.456 
.386 
.379 
.579 
.587 
.494 
.347 
.322 
.362 
 
.327 
.345 
.281 
 
.264 
.159 
.299 
.298 
.373 
.429 
 
.698 
.510 
.306 
.439 
 
.346 
.346 
 
.759 
.736 
.833 
.836 
 
.588 
.522 
.718 
 
.816 
.807 
.796 
.809 
.807 
.793 
.798 
.793 
.802 
.834 
.818 
 
.641 
.609 
.661 
 
.684 
.743 
.657 
.667 
.674 
.646 
 
.746 
.691 
.774 
.715 
 
- 
- 
N=243 
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Appendix H: Reliability analysis (sequential) 
 
 
 
Table 23 Reliability statistics 
Variable Cronbach's α Cronbach's α based on 
standardised items 
Number of Items 
PEA .837 .838 4 
AS .711 .709 3 
NC .832 .835 4 
CG .724 .737 3 
RG .751 .751 4 
BD .784 .791 4 
SD .738 .741 2 
N=243 
 
Table 24 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Perceived ERA appropriateness 
Item  PEA1 PEA2 PEA3 PEA4 
PEA1 
PEA2 
PEA3 
PEA4 
1 
.816 
.505 
.515 
 
1 
.552 
.560 
 
 
1 
.438 
 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 25 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Asset specificity 
Item  AS1 AS2 AS3 
AS1 
AS2 
AS3 
1 
.560 
.359 
 
1 
.425 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 26 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Non-contractibility 
Item  NC5 NC8 NC9 NC10 
NC5 
NC8 
NC9 
NC10 
1 
.489 
.488 
.458 
 
1 
.711 
.593 
 
 
1 
.608 
 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 27 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Contractual governance 
Item  CG1 CG2 CG4 
CG1 
CG2 
CG4 
1 
.524 
.451 
 
1 
.474 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 28 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Relational governance 
Item  RG4 RG6 RG7 RG9 
RG4 
RG6 
RG7 
RG9 
1 
.398 
.326 
.399 
 
1 
.429 
.453 
 
 
1 
.577 
 
 
 
1 
N=243 
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Table 29 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Buyer dependence 
Item  BD1 BD2 BD3 BD4 
BD1 
BD2 
BD3 
BD4 
1 
.619 
.365 
.419 
 
1 
.409 
.581 
 
 
1 
.528 
 
 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 30 Reliability analysis inter-item correlation matrix Supplier dependence 
Item  SD1 SD2 
SD1 
SD2 
1 
.588 
 
1 
N=243 
 
Table 31 Reliability analysis item statistics 
Variable 
Item 
Mean Standard deviation 
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
PEA1  
PEA2  
PEA3  
PEA4  
Asset specificity 
AS1  
AS2  
AS3  
Non-contractibility 
NC5  
NC8  
NC9  
NC10  
Contractual governance 
CG1  
CG2  
CG4  
Relational governance 
RG4  
RG6  
RG7  
RG9  
Buyer dependence 
BD1  
BD2  
BD3  
BD4  
Supplier dependence 
SD1  
SD2  
 
2.49 
2.45 
1.95 
2.32 
 
2.91 
3.04 
3.48 
 
3.52 
3.58 
3.75 
3.59 
 
3.40 
3.88 
3.34 
 
3.92 
3.84 
3.64 
3.74 
 
2.82 
2.47 
3.29 
2.36 
 
3.74 
3.26 
 
1.034 
0.992 
0.882 
1.093 
 
1.015 
1.032 
0.840 
 
0.789 
0.779 
0.702 
0.701 
 
1.029 
0.728 
0.804 
 
0.703 
0.664 
0.797 
0.768 
 
0.995 
0.854 
0.996 
0.818 
 
0.769 
0.864 
N=243 
 
Table 32 Reliability analysis item-total statistics  
Variable 
Item 
Scale mean if 
item deleted 
Scale variance if 
item deleted 
Corrected 
item-total 
correlation 
Squared 
multiple 
correlation 
Cronbach's 
α if item 
deleted 
Perceived ERA appropriateness 
PEA1 
PEA2 
PEA3 
PEA4  
Asset specificity 
AS1  
 
6.72 
6.76 
7.26 
6.88 
 
6.52 
 
5.981 
5.970 
7.300 
6.392 
 
2.507 
 
.743 
.795 
.573 
.583 
 
.555 
 
.674 
.709 
.334 
.345 
 
.331 
 
.759 
.736 
.833 
.836 
 
.588 
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AS2  
AS3  
Non-contractibility 
NC5 
NC8  
NC9  
NC10  
Contractual governance 
CG1  
CG2  
CG4  
Relational governance 
RG4  
RG6  
RG7  
RG9  
Buyer dependence 
BD1  
BD2  
BD3  
BD4  
Supplier dependence 
SD1  
SD2  
6.40 
5.95 
 
10.93 
10.86 
10.70 
10.86 
 
7.21 
6.74 
7.28 
 
11.22 
11.30 
11.50 
11.40 
 
8.12 
8.47 
7.65 
8.58 
 
3.26 
3.74 
2.347 
3.267 
 
3.614 
3.250 
3.477 
3.641 
 
1.731 
2.451 
2.374 
 
3.289 
3.221 
2.788 
2.762 
 
4.755 
4.911 
4.931 
5.178 
 
0.747 
0.592 
.604 
.445 
 
.549 
.721 
.732 
.655 
 
.565 
.588 
.525 
 
.458 
.540 
.573 
.626 
 
.566 
.676 
.515 
.632 
 
.588 
.588 
.371 
.202 
 
.302 
.561 
.570 
.440 
 
.327 
.345 
.281 
 
.222 
.293 
.371 
.410 
 
.698 
.510 
.306 
.439 
 
.346 
.346 
.522 
.718 
 
.840 
.759 
.758 
.790 
 
.641 
.609 
.661 
 
.740 
.699 
.680 
.647 
 
.746 
.691 
.774 
.715 
 
- 
- 
N=243 
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Appendix I: Histograms 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Histogram of Perceived ERA appropriateness22  
 
 
Figure 5 Histogram of Asset specificity  
 
  
                                                 
22 As mentioned in section 4.2, the histograms of variables PEA, AS, NC and RG show several striking anomalies, that have all 
been marked by interrupted red circles. 
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Figure 6 Histogram of Non-contractibility  
 
 
Figure 7 Histogram of Contractual governance  
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Figure 8 Histogram of Relational governance  
 
 
Figure 9 Histogram of Buyer’s net dependence  
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Figure 10 Histogram of Total interdependence  
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Appendix J: Scatter plots 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Matrix scatter plot of the conceptual model’s 7 variables23 
  
                                                 
23 In this appendix darker markings in a plot indicate multiple observations on that specific coordinate 
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Figure 12 Matrix scatter plot of Perceived ERA appropriateness and Asset specificity 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Matrix scatter plot of Perceived ERA appropriateness and Non-contractibility 
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Figure 14 Matrix scatter plot of Perceived ERA appropriateness and Contractual governance 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Matrix scatter plot of Perceived ERA appropriateness and Relational governance 
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Figure 16 Matrix scatter plot of Perceived ERA appropriateness and Buyer’s net dependence 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Matrix scatter plot of Perceived ERA appropriateness and Total interdependence 
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Appendix K: T-test PPS 
 
 
 
Table 33 T-test group statistics 
Variable  
 
PPS sector Frequency Mean Standard 
deviation 
Standard error 
mean 
PEA 
 
AS 
 
NC 
 
CG 
 
RG 
 
BND 
 
TI 
 
Private 
Public 
Private 
Public 
Private 
Public 
Private 
Public 
Private 
Public 
Private 
Public 
Private 
Public 
173 
70 
173 
70 
173 
70 
173 
70 
173 
70 
173 
70 
173 
70 
9.12 
9.41 
9.68 
8.84 
14.60 
14.07 
10.87 
9.97 
15.25 
14.87 
4.23 
3.24 
18.45 
16.67 
3.301 
3.268 
2.397 
1.961 
2.439 
2.367 
2.161 
1.711 
2.273 
2.092 
3.065 
2.596 
3.399 
3.234 
.251 
.391 
.182 
.234 
.185 
.283 
.164 
.204 
.173 
.250 
.233 
.310 
.258 
.386 
N=243 
 
Table 34 T-test independent samples test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances T-test for equality of means 
Variable Assumption F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean  
diff. 
Std 
error  
diff. 
Lower 
conf. 
Upper 
conf. 
PEA 
 
AS* 
 
NC 
 
CG* 
 
RG 
 
BND* 
 
TI* 
Equal var. ass. 
Equal var. not ass. 
Equal var. ass. 
Equal var. not ass. 
Equal var. ass. 
Equal var. not ass. 
Equal var. ass. 
Equal var. not ass. 
Equal var. ass. 
Equal var. not ass. 
Equal var. ass. 
Equal var. not ass. 
Equal var. ass. 
Equal var. not ass. 
.008 
 
4.699 
 
.002 
 
6.786 
 
.055 
 
1.292 
 
.459 
 
.928 
 
.031 
 
.966 
 
.010 
 
.815 
 
.257 
 
.499 
 
-.628 
-.631 
2.580 
2.808 
1.546 
1.566 
3.116 
3.436 
1.216 
1.260 
2.360 
2.532 
3.735 
3.815 
241 
128.9 
241 
154.9 
241 
131.3 
241 
160.1 
241 
138.1 
241 
149.7 
241 
133.8 
.531 
.529 
.010 
.006 
.123 
.120 
.002 
.001 
.225 
.210 
.019 
.012 
.000 
.000 
-.293 
-.293 
.833 
.833 
.530 
.530 
.901 
.901 
.383 
.383 
.983 
.983 
1.774 
1.774 
.466 
.464 
.323 
.297 
.343 
.338 
.289 
.262 
.315 
.304 
.416 
.388 
.475 
.465 
-1.211 
-1.212 
.197 
.247 
-.145 
-.139 
.332 
.383 
-.237 
-.218 
.163 
.216 
.838 
.854 
.626 
.626 
1.470 
1.420 
1.205 
1.199 
1.471 
1.419 
1.003 
.984 
1.803 
1.749 
2.709 
2.693 
N=243, * Sig. (2-tailed) is also called the p-value If the significance in Levene's test for equality of variances is below 0.05, 
then equal variance is NOT assumed. If not, equal variance is assumed. If in the T-test for equality of means the p-value is 
below 0.05, the means are assumed to be NOT equal (in this sample on AS, CG, BND and TI). 
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Appendix L: Variance analysis OS  
 
 
 
Table 35 Report 
Organisation size Frequency Mean Standard deviation 
Less than 100 employees 
100 - 200 employees 
201 - 500 employees 
501 - 1.000 employees 
More than 1.000 employees 
Total 
9 
11 
26 
37 
160 
243 
8.78 
10.45 
9.19 
8.84 
9.23 
9.21 
3.270 
3.078 
2.315 
2.968 
3.511 
3.288 
N=243 
 
Table 36 ANOVA table 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
PEA*[OS] Between Groups (Combined) 
Within Groups 
Total 
23.920 
2,591.792 
2,615.712 
4 
238 
242 
5.980 
10.890 
.549 .700 
 
Table 37 Measures of association 
 Eta Eta squared 
PEA*[OS] .096 .009 
 
The differences between the means are small. 
Eta squared equals .009, which implies that only .9% of PEA is explained by OS. 
F equals .549 and is low. 
The p-value (Sig.) is .700 and is high (more specifically much larger than .05). 
This implies that the sample shows that there is no significant difference between the means. Therefore there is not a 
significant relation between Organisation size and Perceived ERA appropriateness (F=.549, p=.700) in this sample. 
 
Table 38 Summary of ANOVA for independent variables and OS 
Variable F-value p-value Eta Eta squared 
PEA 
AS 
NC 
CG 
RG 
BND 
TI 
.549 
.559 
.526 
.510 
.351 
1.259 
.175 
.700 
.693 
.717 
.728 
.843 
.287 
.951 
.096 
.096 
.094 
.092 
.077 
.144 
.054 
.009 
.009 
.009 
.009 
.006 
.021 
.003 
N=243 
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Appendix M: Variance analysis UH  
 
 
 
Table 39 Report 
Usage history Frequency Mean Standard deviation 
Non usage 
Trial usage 
Low usage 
High usage 
Past usage 
Total 
149 
27 
47 
15 
5 
243 
8.11 
10.44 
11.02 
13.13 
6.20 
9.21 
2.588 
2.118 
3.819 
3.543 
1.643 
3.288 
N=243 
 
Table 40 ANOVA table 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
PEA*[UH] Between Groups (Combined) 
Within Groups 
Total 
650.473 
1,965.239 
2,615.712 
4 
238 
243 
162.618 
8.257 
19.694 .000 
 
Table 41 Measures of association 
 Eta Eta squared 
PEA*[UH] .499 .249 
 
The differences between the means are not small. 
Eta squared equals .249, which implies that 24.9% of PEA is explained by UH. 
F equals 19.694 and is high. 
The p-value (Sig.) is .000 and is low (more specifically much lower than .05). 
This implies that the sample shows that there is a significant difference between the means. Therefore there is a significant 
relation between Usage history and Perceived ERA appropriateness (F=19.694, p=.000) in this sample. 
 
Table 42 Summary of ANOVA for independent variables and UH 
Variable F-value p-value Eta Eta squared 
PEA 
AS 
NC 
CG 
RG 
BND 
TI 
19.694 
.577 
.717 
.749 
.630 
1.937 
.768 
.000 
.679 
.581 
.560 
.642 
.105 
.547 
.499 
.098 
.109 
.111 
.102 
.178 
.113 
.249 
.010 
.012 
.012 
.010 
.032 
.013 
N=243 
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Appendix N: Multiple regression analysis 
 
 
 
Table 43 Correlations 
  PEA AS NC CG RG BND TI 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
PEA 
AS 
NC 
CG 
RG 
BND 
TI 
PEA 
AS 
NC 
CG 
RG 
BND* 
TI 
1 
.080 
.099 
-.030 
.051 
-.173 
-.102 
 
.216 
.123 
.641 
.426 
.007 
.112 
.080 
1 
.178 
.241 
.153 
.248 
.395 
.216 
 
.005 
.000 
.017 
.000 
.000 
.099 
.178 
1 
.051 
.431 
-.010 
.045 
.123 
.005 
 
.429 
.000 
.882 
.489 
-.030 
.241 
.051 
1 
.140 
.161 
.304 
.641 
.000 
.429 
 
.029 
.012 
.000 
.051 
.153 
.431 
.140 
1 
-.043 
.187 
.426 
.017 
.000 
.029 
 
.509 
.003 
-.173 
.248 
-.010 
.161 
-.043 
1 
.596 
.007 
.000 
.882 
.012 
.509 
 
.000 
-.102 
.395 
.045 
.304 
.187 
.596 
1 
.112 
.000 
.489 
.000 
.003 
.000 
 
N=243, * Indicates statistically significant Pearson correlation with PEA 
 
In Table 43, the Pearson correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable PEA indicate relatively 
weak relationships. The strongest Pearson correlation (negative) is between PEA and BND at -.173, yet all Pearson 
correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable are less than the standard of .3 (Pallant, 2005). 
The table shows that the correlation between PEA and BND as is the only Pearson correlation in the table that is significant. 
This is indicated by the p-value (Sig.) of .007 which is less than .05 (or 5%). 
 
Table 44 Model summary24 
Model R R² R² 
adjusted 
Standard error 
of the estimate 
1 .232 .054 .030 3.238 
 
Table 44 shows an R²-value of .054. This means that 5.4% of the variance in the dependent variable PEA can be explained by 
the independent variables AS, NC, CG, RG, BND and TI in the conceptual model. Since this study works with a large sample, 
it is possible to use the R²-value and not necessary to use the adjusted R²-value (Pallant, 2005). 
 
Table 45 ANOVA25 
Model  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean square  F Sig. 
1 Regression 
Residual 
Total 
140.792 
2,474.920 
2,615.712 
6 
236 
242 
23.465 
10.487 
 
2.238 
 
 
.040 
 
 
 
 
Table 45 shows the results of the testing of the null-hypothesis that multiple R in the population equals 0 (it tests whether 
all B-values in the model are equal to each other and equal to 0). Since the p-value equals .040, and because .040 is less 
than .05 (or 5%), this means that the null-hypothesis has to be rejected and that the result of the model is statistically 
significant. 
  
                                                 
24 Dependent Variable: PEA. Predictors related to R: (Constant), AS, NC, CG, RG, BND, TI. 
25 Dependent Variable: PEA. Predictors related to Sig.: (Constant), AS, NC, CG, RG, BND, TI. 
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Table 46 Coefficients26 
  Non 
standardised 
coefficients 
 Standardised 
coefficients 
  95.0% 
Confidence interval for B 
Model  B Std.  
Error 
β T-stat p-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
1 (Constant) 
AS 
NC 
CG 
RG 
BND 
TI 
7.845 
.190 
.103 
-.038 
.005 
-.191 
-.047 
1.952 
.101 
.096 
.106 
.108 
.089 
.083 
 
.134 
.076 
-.024 
.003 
-.172 
-.049 
4.019 
1.889 
1.065 
-.355 
.047 
-2.138 
-.563 
.000 
.060 
.288 
.723 
.962 
.034 
.574 
4.000 
-.008 
-.087 
-.248 
-.208 
-.367 
-.211 
11.691 
.389 
.293 
.172 
.218 
-.015 
.117 
 
The contents of table 46 show that from the independent variables of the model, variable BND contributed the most to the 
prediction of the dependent variable PEA. This is based upon the highest scores of BND (-.172) in the column β. These 
dimensionless same-scale standardised coefficients β enable the comparison of the contribution of each independent 
variable (Pallant, 2005). In order to check if the variable contributions are statistically significant unique contributions, one 
has to check the p-value that can be found in the Sig. column. If the p-value is less than .05, the particular variable is a 
significant unique contributor in predicting the dependent variable. This is only the case for BND (p=.034). 
 
  
                                                 
26 Dependent Variable: PEA. 
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Appendix O: Alternative multiple regression analyses 
 
 
 
Several alternative checks were performed on the survey data.  
 
Firstly, a simultaneous multiple regression analysis was performed on only the respondents from the 
private sector (N=173). This analysis led to the discarding of items NC1, NC12, NC13, CG3, RG1, RG2, 
RG3, RG5, RG8, BD3, SD3 and SD4. The remaining items were AS1, AS2, AS3, NC2, NC3, NC4, NC5, 
NC6, NC7, NC8, NC9, NC10, NC11, CG1, CG2, CG4, RG4, RG6, RG7, RG9, BD1, BD2, BD4, SD1 and SD2. 
The multiple regression analysis resulted in a significant model (.046) with significant variables AS 
(.030) and BND (.012).  
 
Secondly, a simultaneous multiple regression analysis was performed the respondents from both 
sectors but only the respondents with a survey processing time between 6 to 60 minutes (N=164). 
This analysis led to the discarding of items AS3 NC1, NC2, NC3, NC4, NC6, NC11, NC12, NC13, CG3, 
RG1, RG2, RG5, RG8, SD1 and SD3. The remaining items were AS1, AS2, AS4, NC5, NC7, NC8, NC9, 
NC10, CG1, CG2, CG4, RG3, RG4, RG6, RG7, RG9, BD1, BD2, BD3, BD4, SD2 and SD4. In this case, 
Cronbach’s α of the SD construct was not sufficiently high (.559<.600).  
 
Thirdly, a simultaneous multiple regression analysis was performed on only the respondents from the 
private sector and only the respondents with a survey processing time between 6 to 60 minutes 
(N=116). This analysis led to the discarding of items AS3, NC1, NC2, NC3, NC4, NC6, NC7, NC11, NC12, 
NC13, CG3, RG1, RG2, RG8, SD1 and SD3. The remaining items were AS1, AS2, AS4, NC5, NC8, NC9, 
NC10, CG1, CG2, CG4, RG3, RG4, RG5, RG6, RG7, RG9, BD1, BD2, BD3, BD4, SD2 and SD4. In this case, 
Cronbach’s α of the SD construct also was not sufficiently high (.580<.600). 
